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South African ports are regulated by a compulsory pilotage system. This means that 
when a vessel enters or leaves any of the South African Ports regulated by Transnet 
National Ports Authority, this vessel is obliged by law to utilize a pilot to navigate the 
vessel safely into and out of the port. The reason for doing so is to reduce the risk of 
incidents that occur within the ports due to the fact that the pilots have specialized 
knowledge of the port’s specific conditions. However, collisions may still occur in 
these ports. One such incident is the collision of the MV Stella Tingas. 
 
The case of the MV Stella Tingas brought to light the unacceptable situation created by 
the lacunae in the Legal Succession To The South African Transport Act of 1989, 
where the innocent vessel that was involved in a collision with a vessel under 
compulsory pilotage could not get satisfaction for damages from either the ship-owner 
of the guilty vessel or from the Port Authority. In order to resolve this position, the 
Legislature enacted the National Ports Act 12 of 2005, specifically section 76, to 
resolve this problem. Section 76(2) states that the ship-owners of vessels under 
compulsory pilotage will be liable for all actions of a pilot, whilst section 76(1) provide 
that the Port Authority will not be liable for actions of the pilot done in good faith. The 
National Ports Act has however not defined good faith and the courts have not 
interpreted this concept since the commencement of the Act.   
 
This dissertation will investigate what good faith is, by examining exclusionary clauses 
and by exploring the concepts of gross negligence and intention in order to ascertain 
whether good faith excludes these concepts. Thereafter the dissertation will seek to 
discover a test that can be used in order to assess whether the actions of the pilot were 
done in good faith or not.  
 
 The dissertation will trace the history of compulsory pilotage from its origins in 
English Law to South African law. It will also examine the relationship between the 
master and the pilot as well as the circumstances where the master can intervene in the 
affairs of the pilot, by ascertaining what an emergency is, as contemplated by the 







1.1 Background and Rationale 
Trade by sea is the lifeblood of world trade, and it accounts for approximately for 90% 




 estimates that: 
 
“approximately 96% of [South Africa’s] exports are conveyed by sea, and the 
eight commercial ports [of South Africa] are the conduits for trade between 
South Africa and its Southern African partners as well as hubs for traffic to 




When vessels arrive at any of the commercial ports, a pilot is sent from the port to the 
vessel, in order to navigate the vessel into the harbour confines, and the same applies to 
vessels leaving the harbour. These ports are known as compulsory pilotage ports.
4
 
Compulsory pilotage is regulated by the National Ports Act (“NPA”),
5
 which makes it 
mandatory for all vessels entering, leaving or making use of the ports under the 
jurisdiction of the National Ports Authority (“the Authority”)
6
 to use the services of a 
pilot which is provided by the Authority.
7
 In terms of rule 41 of the Port Rules,
8
 the 
functions of the pilot are inter alia “[to] navigate a vessel in the port, determine its 





The aim of these provisions are to minimize the risk of collisions of vessels that enter, 
leave or make use of the ports through the pilot’s knowledge of the port’s specific 
                                                 
1
Cluster maritime François ‘The Importance of the Sea’, available at: http://www.cluster-
maritime.fr/article.php?lang=Uk&id=2, accessed on 11 October 2013. 
2
 SAinfo Reporter ‘South Africa's Transport Network’ available at: 
http://www.southafrica.info/business/economy/infrastructure/transport.htm#.UpJKHaUhHwI, accessed 
on 6 September 2013. 
3
 ibid, the eight commercial ports are Richards Bay and Durban in KwaZulu-Natal; East London, Port 
Elizabeth and the Port of Ngqura in the Eastern Cape; and Mossel Bay, Cape Town and Saldanha in the 
Western Cape. 
4
 John Hare ‘Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa’ 2nd ed (2009) 481; The Port 
Rules published in terms of National Ports Act 12 of 2005, published as GN 1090 in the Government 
Gazette Number 31986 of 6 March 2009, Rule 40 
5
 National Ports Act 12 of 2005, extracts of the Act are provided in Annexure A 
6
 Transnet National Ports Authority, a division of Transnet SOC Limited. 
7
 Hare (see Note 4 above) 481; the Port Rules (see Note 4 above), Rule 40 
8
 The Port Rules ibid, Rule 41 
9
 ibid, Rule 41 read with section 75(3) of the NPA (see Annexure A) 
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conditions. These pilots are familiar with the local conditions of the ports, such as the 
levels of the water, sand banks and other conditions, that masters of foreign vessels 
would not otherwise have insight into. During the phase of navigation by the pilot, the 
master remains in command of the vessel.
10
 However, the master cannot interfere with 




Despite these precautions there may be situations whereby collisions occur whilst 
vessels are under compulsory pilotage. An example of this is the case of the MV Stella 
Tingas
12
 where the MV Atlantica, which was under compulsory pilotage, collided with 
the MV Stella Tingas, which was berthed at the time of the collision. In the 
circumstances where a collision does occur whilst the vessel is under compulsory 
pilotage, the Authority and the pilot will not be liable for actions done in good faith by 
the pilot as the pilots are deemed to be the servant of the ship-owner whilst navigating 
the vessel, and accordingly the owner of the vessel will be liable for the actions of the 
pilot.
13
 The NPA, however, is silent on what good faith entails and whether it will 
include intentional harm or gross negligence. There are therefore issues around the 
liability for compulsory pilotage, which is important to examine and address and this is 
the aim of the dissertation. 
 
1.2 Structure of the Dissertation 
This dissertation will take an in-depth look at compulsory pilotage in South Africa. It 
will begin with a historical background in Chapter 2. This will be achieved by 
explaining what compulsory pilotage entails as well as by providing an understanding 
of the reasons for compulsory pilotage. Subsequently, paying particular attention to 
section 6 of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act (“AJRA”),
14
 the chapter will 
explore compulsory pilotage within the United Kingdom, as South African maritime 
history largely traces its roots to the United Kingdom. After this exploration is 
undertaken, the history of South African compulsory pilotage will be examined in 
                                                 
10




 MV Stella Tingas: Transnet Ltd t/a Portnet v Owners of the MV Stella Tingas and Another 2003 (2) 
SA 473 (SCA) 
13
 The NPA (see Annexure A), section 76(2)  
14
 Admiralty Regulation Jurisdiction Act 105 of 1983 
 
 8 
order to understand the reasoning behind the enactment of the NPA, specifically 
regarding the liability of ship-owners and the Authority.  
 
Chapter 3 will then commence with an examination of the responsibilities of the pilot, 
such as the navigation of the vessel into and out of a port. The relationship between the 
pilot and master of the vessel will be explored, specifically regarding the divided 
command, where a double authority between the master and the pilot may exist. This 
chapter will then conclude with the circumstances in which the master can intervene in 
the affairs of the pilot with references to cases, from the 19
th
 century, decided by Dr. 
Lushington of the High Court of Admiralty in the United Kingdom as well as a look at 
section 75(6) of the NPA, which regulates this position in South Africa. 
 
Chapter 4, which is the core chapter of the dissertation, will analyse the liability for 
damages when there is an incident while the pilot is in charge. This chapter will begin 
with an examination of the ship-owner’s liability specifically with reference to section 
76(2) of the NPA as well as with reference to the case of the MV Stella Tingas. 
Thereafter, the liability of the Authority will be analysed in-depth, starting with a 
consideration of exemption clauses and the way in which the courts have interpreted 
them. An investigation of the three important and relevant concepts, namely, gross 
negligence, intention and good faith, will be undertaken. Chapter 4 will subsequently 
examine a case study of the MV Smart that grounded just outside of the Richards Bay 
harbour and will conclude with recommendations for compulsory pilotage liability. 
 
The purpose of the study is to assess the laws governing compulsory pilotage, looking 
closely at the relationship of the master and pilot as well as the aspect of liability in 
circumstances where the actions of the pilot are either grossly negligent or intentional.  
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
The NPA introduces a new concept of “good faith” within the context of liability, 
where the ship-owners will be liable for acts of the pilot that were done in good faith. 
The NPA does not define the concept of good faith. Thus the concept is left open to 
interpretation in order to determine what “good faith” encompasses.
15
 The question 
                                                 
15
 Hare (see Note 4 above) 493 
 
 9 
therefore is whether such pilot is still acting in good faith where his actions constitute 
intentional harm or gross negligence. 
 
1.4 Keys Questions to be answered  
The dissertation will be centered on the investigation of the following questions:   
1.4.1 What is the relationship between the master and the pilot? 
1.4.2 At what point and under what circumstances can the master intervene with the 
affairs of the pilot? 
1.4.3 What is the extent of the liability of owners and masters where pilotage is 
compulsory? 
1.4.4 When will the Authority be liable for acts of the pilot? 
 
1.5 Research Methodology  
The research for this paper is desktop based. The dissertation will be focused primarily 
on the analysis of case law and legislation. The dissertation will also seek journal 
articles and textbooks in order to unearth the history of compulsory pilotage and its 
development in South African law.  
 
1.6 Conclusion 
The dissertation will conclude by summarizing the position of compulsory pilotage 
within South Africa and demonstrate how liability for the pilot’s actions is placed upon 
the ship-owner. It will also put forward recommendations as to measures that could be 
put in place such as making it mandatory for the Authority to create an insurance 
policy that caters specifically for situations of collisions, where infrastructure of the 
port is damaged, that are caused by the pilots during their services whether these 












History of Compulsory Pilotage 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will begin by explaining what compulsory pilotage is. Before tracing the 
history of compulsory pilotage in South Africa, its development in the United 
Kingdom will be examined, tracing its roots as far back as the 19
th
 century. The reason 
for choosing the United Kingdom for comparison will be expounded upon with 





The history of compulsory pilotage in South Africa will then be addressed, starting 
with an analysis of the Legal Succession To The South African Transport Services Act 
(“SATS Act”),
2
 which governed compulsory pilotage ports and briefly examining the 
cases which were considered under this Act, such as the Banglar Mookh,
3
 Yung Chun 
Fishery
4
 and the MV Stella Tingas as these cases will be analysed in depth in Chapter 4 
of the dissertation. The MV Stella Tingas is particularly important as it highlighted the 
lacuna that had been created by the SATS Act. The Act resulted in the situation in 
which innocent ship-owners would not be able to get any satisfaction for damages 
caused to their vessels in the event of a collision caused by the pilot of the guilty 
vessel, because neither the ship-owners of the guilty vessels or the Authority would be 
liable for the actions of pilots while the vessels were under compulsory pilotage.  
 
The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the NPA, which was created in order to 
solve the problems created by the limitations in the application of the SATS Act. 
However before an examination of the history is started, an exploration of what 
compulsory pilotage is will be undertaken. 
 
 
                                                 
1 
MV Stella Tingas: Transnet Ltd t/a Portnet v Owners of the MV Stella Tingas and Another 2003 (2) SA 
473 (SCA); Admiralty Regulation Jurisdiction Act (“AJRA”) 105 of 1983, section 6 
2
 Legal Succession To The South African Transport Services Act 9 of 1989 
3
 MV Banglar Mookh; Owners of MV Banglar Mookh v Transnet Ltd 2012 (4) SA 300 (SCA) 
4
 
The MFV Yung Chun No 17: Yung Chun Fishery Company Limited v Transnet Limited t/a Portnet 
(Reportable as WCC case No AC 30/97, 1 September 2000), available at: 
http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/shiplaw/fulltext/yungchun.pdf, accessed on 25 June 2013. 
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2.2 Compulsory Pilotage 
Before examining what compulsory pilotage entails, it is important to understand what 
a pilot is. The NPA does not define what a pilot is, but merely states that a pilot is a 
“person [who is] licensed in terms of section 77 to provide pilotage services”.
5
 
According to Parks and Cattell
6
 a pilot is “a person taken on board [a ship] at a 
particular place for the purpose of conducting a ship through a river, road or channel or 




In South Africa, the NPA regulates compulsory pilotage within the jurisdiction of the 
Authority.
8
 There are two types of pilotage, namely voluntary and compulsory 
pilotage.
9
 The focus in this dissertation is predominately on compulsory pilotage ports 
as all of the South African ports are compulsory pilotage ports, but for completeness 
voluntary pilotage will be briefly discussed. In voluntary pilotage, the master has the 





 suggests that it is rare for voluntary pilotage to occur, due to the fact that there 
are no ports under the Authority’s jurisdiction that are voluntary. He goes on to state 
that, “although… it is permissible to engage the services of a pilot voluntarily outside 
the compulsory pilotage areas, circumstances giving rise to the need for a voluntary 
pilot are limited”.
12
   
 
In contrast to this, in compulsory pilotage, a master is compelled by law to use a 
designated pilot provided by the harbour authority.
13
 When a vessel arrives at a port, a 
pilot with local knowledge and skills must navigate the vessel into the harbour.
14
 
                                                 
5
 National Ports Act 12 of 2005, section 1, read with section 77 of the NPA, which covers the 
certification and licensing of pilots   
6




 The NPA (see Note 5 above), section 10, states that all ports fall under the jurisdiction of the 
Authority. 
9
 John Hare ‘Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa’ 2nd ed (2009) 480 
10
 NJJ Gaskell, C Debattista and RJ Swatton “Chorley and Giles’ Shipping Law’ 8th ed, (1987) 347 
11




 ibid 482 
14





 indicates a number of reasons for why compulsory pilotage is necessary within 
ports; these are as follows:  
 
“First, the amount of running room a ship has is restricted. Sudden turns, 
adjustments to course, and short stops can be made, if at all, only at great risk. 
Second, there are a number of obstructions, which are found only in a harbour. 
Such obstructions include buoys, channel markings, cable lines, and 
navigational lights. Although these items are designed to help the mariner, 
they also act as an obstacle course, which must be navigated around. Third, the 
number of boats near a maneuvering ship is greatly increased. Not only are 
there other seagoing ships coming into or leaving the harbour, but there are 
other vessels- tugs, barges, fireboats, ferries and local patrol boats-which will 
never be encountered except in the harbour. In addition, pleasure crafts, many 
of them steered by casual or weekend boaters with little or no experience in 
the rules of the road, will be present. Because of their small size, many of 
these vessels will never venture far from land and are therefore unknown in 
ocean traffic. All of these ships, from the ferry boat engaged in her usual run, 
to the yacht cruising up and down the shore, have the potential for causing a 
collision with an ocean-going ship trying to leave or enter local waters. 
Finally, there are natural conditions, which make navigating in a harbour 
difficult and potentially dangerous. Sandbars, which can quickly ground a 






 in agreement to Jarvis’ submission, suggests that there is an additional reason, 
which is that “compulsory pilotage was based on the need for national security and the 
protection of life and property in [the] harbour and port areas… [although] some say… 
that this is nothing more than… a means of raising revenue.”
18
   
 
2.3 Reason for Choosing the United Kingdom 
The reason for choosing the United Kingdom as a comparator is due to the fact that 
most of South African maritime law originated from the United Kingdom; this can be 
observed by considering the history of maritime law within South Africa.
19
 In the 19
th
 
century, all maritime matters arising in South Africa had to be adjudicated by the 
Admiralty courts in England; however this became unfeasible and accordingly the 
                                                 
15
 Robert M. Jarvis ‘Confusion in the Harbour: Compulsory Pilots Collide with the Motorship FSIA’ 
(1985) 16 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 1010, available at: 
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1185&context=njilb, 
accessed by 5 May 2013. 
16
 Jarvis ibid 1013; David J Bederman ‘Compulsory Pilotage, Public Policy, and the Early Private 
International Law of Torts’ 64 (1989-1990) Tul. L. Rev. 1033 1989-1990, at 1042  
17




 For a detailed discussion on the reasoning for using maritime law of the United Kingdom, see Hare 
(see Note 9 above) 483- 486 
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Vice-Admiralty courts were established in all the British colonies including South 
Africa.
20
 The Vice-Admiralty Courts Act (“VACA”)
21
 gave the Vice-Admiralty Courts 
the powers to adjudicate all maritime matters that were exercised by the English High 
Court of Admiralty.
22
 When the Vice-Admiralty Courts were established in South 
Africa in 1863, it brought about a similar problem to that experienced in England, that 
being the creation of two courts with concurrent jurisdiction.
23
 The common law courts 
in South Africa essentially applied Roman Dutch law whereas the Vice-Admiralty 
Courts applied English admiralty law, meaning that, depending on the court chosen, 
different outcomes could be possible for the parties involved.
24
    
 
In order to resolve this problem, the English legislature enacted the Colonial Courts of 
Admiralty Act (“CCAA”),
25
 which repealed the Vice-Admiralty Courts Act. The 
CCAA gave jurisdiction to the Colonial Courts of Admiralty to exercise the same 
jurisdiction as the High Court of England in 1890.
26
 The CCAA essentially conferred 
upon such courts the same jurisdiction as the High Court of England, as it existed at the 
time when the Act was passed.
27
 The CCAA not only conferred the same jurisdiction 
that was exercised by the English High court upon the Colonial Courts of Admiralty 
but also determined the law to be applied by the court, namely English admiralty law.
28
 
                                                 
20
 Gys Hofmeyr ‘Admiralty Jurisdiction Law and Practice in South Africa’ 2nd ed (2012) 3 
21
 Vice-Admiralty Courts Act, 1863 [26 & 27 Vict. c. 24]  
22
 Hofmeyr (see Note 20 above) 1 
23








 Malilang and others v MV Houda Pearl 1986 (2) SA 714 (A), where the issue before the court was 
whether the CCAA conferred the trial court and appeal court with admiralty jurisdiction; Yuri Maru, the 
Woron [1927] AC 906 (PC) at 915-6, also having to decide on this point, held that the court, as a 
Colonial Court of Admiralty, has the same jurisdiction as the admiralty jurisdiction which the High 
Court of England had at the passing of the Act.   
28
 Crooks & Co Appellants v Agricultural Co-Operative Union Ltd Respondents 1922 AD 423; see also 
Tharros Shipping Corporation SA v The Golden Ocean 1972 (4) SA 316 (N): this case concerned an 
action in rem where a writ of summons in rem was issued against The Golden Ocean, The Golden Ocean 
was not the ship against which the claim arose. The defendant’s attorney entered an appearance to 
defend the action, which was filed under protest, without prejudice to the defendants right to object to 
the jurisdiction of the court either to sit as a court of admiralty or to exercise the powers of a court of 
admiralty in respect of this action. The court held that it is a court of admiralty by virtue of the 
provisions of the CCAA of 1890, even though Natal is no longer a British possession. The court also 
submitted that the manifest intention of the legislature was to continue in force all laws in the colonies at 
the material time in any part of the Union of South Africa and thereafter the Republic or in any territory 
in respect of which parliament is competent to legislate; see also Trivett & Co (Pty) Ltd v WM Brandt’s 
Sons & Co Ltd 1975 (3) SA 423 (A), an application for an order granted in the trial to be set aside on the 





 submits that the jurisdiction of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty included 
“claims ‘for, arising out of, or relating to… damage caused by or to a ship, whether by 
collision or otherwise” and were to be decided by that court according to English 
admiralty law.
30
 He further submits that although claims pertaining to pilotage are not 
as clear as all other maritime claims due to the fact that it was not specifically 
mentioned in either the 1840 Act or the 1861 Act, they nevertheless will still fall 
within the jurisdiction of the High Court of England. He reasons that this is the case 
due to the numerous 19
th




Subsequently the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act (“AJRA”)
32
 was enacted 
which also included a provision that English law must be used when dealing with 
certain maritime claims within South Africa. Section 6 of AJRA, which deals with law 
and rules to be applied, states in the relevant sub-sections, the following: 
 
“6(1)  Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law or the common 
law contained a court in the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction shall- 
(a) With regard to any matter in respect of which a court of 
admiralty of the Republic referred to in the Colonial Courts of 
Admiralty Act, 1890, of the United Kingdom, had jurisdiction 
immediately before the commencement of this Act, apply the law 
which the High Court of Justice of the United Kingdom in the exercise 
of its admiralty jurisdiction would have applied with regard to such a 
matter at such commencement, in so far as that law can be applied; 
(b)  With regard to any other matter, apply the Roman-Dutch law 
applicable in the Republic. 
(2)  The provisions of subsection (1) shall not derogate from the provisions 
of any law of the Republic applicable to any of the matters 




The section above means that where there is a South African statute that regulates a 
maritime claim, that Act must be applied; however, if that statute is limited and does 
                                                                                                                                 
Colonial Courts of Admiralty with jurisdiction conferred upon such courts by the said Act. The court 
held that S107 of Act 32 of 1961 imported to continuity of laws in the Republic, and this therefore is in 
accordance with the general policy of the Act, namely that, except for the fact that Union of South 
Africa became a Republic and ceased to be in possession of the British, everything was to continue as 
before, including all statutory institutions which operated in the Union of South Africa.   
29
 Hare (see Note 9 above) 484 
30
 The CCAA (see Note 25 above), did not give the Colonial Court of Admiralty exclusive jurisdiction 
over maritime claims, thus it was possible for a claimant to bring a delictual action in the ordinary 
courts, where it would be decided according to Roman Dutch common law. 
31
 Hare (see Note 9 above) 484; the Temora [1860] 167 ER 9 
32





not cover certain legal issues, section 6(1) will be applied.
34
 Thus for claims relating to 
collisions and pilotage which fell within the jurisdiction of the Colonial Courts of 
Admiralty, section 6(1)(a) of AJRA would apply.  
 
This analysis of the law to be applied was set out in the case of the MV Stella Tingas, 
which was an appeal brought by the owners of the MV Stella Tingas and the 
Authority.
35
 The owners of the MV Stella Tingas, alleged inter alia that the owners of 
the Atlantica were liable on the basis that according to section 6 of AJRA, the United 
Kingdom Pilotage Act of 1983 (“PA 1983”)
36
 was applicable, specifically section 35, 
which provided that the ship-owner would be liable for the actions of the compulsory 
pilot, or in the alternative that the ship-owner was liable by virtue of the fact that the 




The court, having analysed section 6, found that the United Kingdom’s PA did not 
apply within this context to the Authority’s liability because the SATS Act regulated 
the position of liability of the Authority in terms of section 6(2).
38
 Even though the 
court found that the PA 1983 did not apply, it did not consider whether any other 
statute after 1891 would apply in any case. By way of comparison, according to 
Schwikkard,
39
 on the law of evidence, the English law that existed at 30 May 1961 will 
be applicable in South Africa, where the local statutes are silent on specific issues. This 
will however, be limited to statutes that were applicable to the British colonies.
40
 
English law after 30 May 1961, according to Schwikkard, is “not binding upon South 
African courts, but does have considerable persuasive force.”
41
 Thus the United 
                                                 
34
 Hare (see Note 9 above) 484 
35
 MV Stella Tingas (SCA) (see Note 1 above) at 479 para 5B, the Authority brought the appeal in 
regard to the finding of the court a quo against them and the owners of the MV Stella Tingas brought a 
counter appeal against the decision in the court a quo, arguing on appeal that the owners of the Atlantica 
were liable according to the admiralty laws of England, in anticipation that the appeal court would find 
in favour of Transnet. 
36
 
The United Kingdom’s Pilotage Act, 1983 c. 21, available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1983/21/pdfs/ukpga_19830021_en.pdf, accessed on 25 June 2013.  
37
 MV Stella Tingas (SCA) (see Note 1 above) at 478 para 2, the ship-owners of the MV Stella Tingas 
also contended that the Authority was liable for the actions of the pilot, which they alleged to be grossly 
negligent or reckless. This will be considered later in this chapter, and in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
38
 ibid at 488 para 31G 
39
 Schwikkard et al ‘Principles of Evidence’ (2009) 24 
40
 ibid, these are also limited to Acts which are not incompatible with South African law or which are 
inconsistent with constitutional provisions 
41
 ibid 29 
 
 16 
Kingdom PA probably did not apply in South Africa in any event as it was not 
expressly applicable to the colonies. 
  
In this case, the courts also examined the aspect of liability on the part of the ship-
owner of the guilty vessel on both grounds contended by the MV Stella Tingas’ 
owners. The court stated that the SATS Act did not regulate the position of liability of 
the ship-owner of the guilty vessel and therefore, according to section 6 of AJRA, the 
law of the United Kingdom as at 1983 would be considered in relation to South 
African maritime claims that are not specifically covered by statute.
42
 The court firstly 
looked at the PA 1983 and found that due to section 10 of the first schedule of the 
SATS Act read with section 6(1) of AJRA, section 35 of the United Kingdom’s PA 
1983, which the owners of the MV Stella Tingas relied on, was not applicable in this 
case.
43
 The courts then turned to the common law of the United Kingdom and found 
that according to the common law a ship-owner will not be liable for the actions of a 
compulsory pilot on board its vessel.
44
 This case will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 4.  
 





submits that:  
 
“To the extent, limited though that may be in relation to compulsory pilotage, 
that any legal issue arising in such claims might not be covered by these 
provisions, the law applicable would, in the present context, generally fall to 





Thus it is clear that South African law is deeply rooted in the law of the United 
Kingdom and therefore it is important to examine English law in order to understand 
issues of compulsory pilotage. The next section will focus on the history of 
compulsory pilotage within the United Kingdom, by looking firstly at the 
                                                 
42
 Hare (see Note 9 above) 483  
43
 MV Stella Tingas (SCA) (see Note 1 above) at 488 para 31G 
44
 ibid at 487 para 29C 
45
 The NPA was enacted as a solution to the void that had been created by the SATS Act, particularly 
with regard to the liability of ship-owners of vessels that are involved in any incidents during navigation 
of the vessel whilst under compulsory pilotage. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
46





Jurisprudence of the United Kingdom’s compulsory pilotage system and then 
examining the United Kingdom’s PA 1913 and 1983. 
 
2.4 Compulsory Pilotage in the United Kingdom 
Compulsory pilotage in the United Kingdom will be examined in two categories, the 
first being related to the jurisprudence of compulsory pilotage in the United Kingdom, 
which will be dealt with briefly, and the second being related to the statutes that 
governed compulsory pilotage thereafter, namely, inter alia the PA 1913 as well as the 
PA 1983. Each will be examined in turn. 
 
2.4.1 Jurisprudence of the United Kingdom’s Compulsory Pilotage System 
Compulsory pilotage has existed in the United Kingdom since the 1500’s, and was 




 points out, these early laws 
indicate both the necessity for and the functions of a pilot. The first charter in 1514 was 
granted to the Trinity House of Deptford Strond (“Trinity House”) by Henry VIII.
50
 
This charter gave certain powers to Trinity House to “control the operations of ship 
men, pilots and mariners” throughout the United Kingdom.
51
 Subsequent charters were 
given by James I in 1604, which, according to Douglas and Geen,
52
 were more 
comprehensive than the 1514 charter but was dissolved by parliament in 1647. 
Thereafter a charter was passed in 1685 by James II which basically provided that a 




After this period, numerous Acts were passed which regulated compulsory pilotage,
54
 
namely, Act 3 Geo. I. c. 13 in 1717,
55
 Act 5 Geo. II c.20 in 1732,
56
 Act 48 Geo. III c. 
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49
 Hare (see Note 9 above) 479 
50
 Douglas and Geen (see Note 48 above) 155; Bederman (see Note 16 above) 1041 
51
 Douglas and Geen ibid, this charter was thereafter confirmed by Edward VI, Queen Mary and Queen 






 For an in-depth analysis of the statutes enacted in this period, see R. G. Marsden ‘Compulsory 
Pilotage’ 4 (1888) L. Q. Rev. 51, available at: http://heinonline.org, accessed on 5 May 2013. 
55
 Act 3 Geo. I. c. 13 in 1717, “regulated… pilots of the Trinity House of Dover, Deal and the Isle of 
Thanet, who have always had the sole piloting and load management of all ships and vessels from said 
places up the river Thames and Medway”; Marsden ibid 52, an important section from this Act was that 





 and Act 52 Geo. III c. 39 in 1812.
58
 The last mentioned Act is the most 
important out of all the Acts passed; this is because section 30 of this Act provided that 
“the owner or master of a ship would not be answerable for any loss or damage caused 
by ‘the incompetence or incapacity of any pilot taken on board’.”
59
 This defence could 
be raised by a ship-owner where damage had been caused solely due to the negligence 
of a pilot on board a vessel during compulsory pilotage.
60
 This defence was known as 
the ‘defence of compulsory pilotage’ and essentially meant that where the damage was 
caused by the fault of the pilot, the ship-owner would escape liability because the ship-
owner was forced to take on the employment of the pilot.
61
 According to Jarvis,
62
 “this 
result had been thought to be fair because it was felt that the respondeat superior nexus 
between the ship-owner and the crew had been broken by the presumably unwanted 




In 1825, Act 6 Geo. IV c. 125 repealed the 1812 Act, nevertheless keeping the 
compulsory pilotage defence and extending the application of the exemption from 
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57
 Act 48 Geo. III c. 104 in 1808; Marsden ibid 53, this Act brought about a penalty upon ships that 
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58
 Act 52 Geo. III c. 39 in 1812; Marsden ibid 53, the penalty from the 1808 Act continued in this Act. 
59
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on 5 May 2013; The Mobile (1856) 14 ER 568 
61
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Appointment Duties Powers Rights and Liabilities’ 2
nd
 ed 1 (London: Stevens And Haynes, 1894) 
Chapter XII, available at: http://heinonline.org, accessed on 5 May 2013 at 447 
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 Jarvis ibid 
64
 Douglas and Geen (see Note 48 above) 157, these trades include vessels trading to either Norway, the 
Kattegat or Baltic, and vessels “wholly laden with stone from Guernsey, Jersey, Alderney, Sark or Man 
and being in production thereof”; Act 6 Geo. IV c. 125 of 1825, section 55 contains the exemption of the 
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suggests that this Act made it compulsory for every in-ward bound ship to the Thames 
to take a pilot “who shall first offer and [the master] ‘shall give charge of his ship’ to 
such pilot”,
66
 this statement he claims is the very cause for the “mischievous 
doctrine”
67





 stated that the laws pertaining to compulsory pilotage were a “confused mass of 
statutes, local and general, orders in council, by-laws and cases”.
69
 In addition the 
Royal Commission’s report in 1836 about the state of existing laws, regulations and 
practices proposed changes that needed to be made in order to clarify the current state 
of compulsory pilotage.
70
 The Committee stated that there were certain problems 
pertaining to compulsory pilotage, such as the fact that vessels were obliged to receive 
on board a pilot “if he shall present himself”, which essentially made what was meant 
to be compulsory pilotage in fact voluntary pilotage; this the committee noted would 




The report recommended a general Act be enacted to be applied in the United 
Kingdom, which would repeal all the existing pilotage Acts.
72
 However, according to 
Douglas and Geen
73
 the report was ignored and two further Acts, namely, Act 3 & 4 
Vict. c. 48 in 1840 and the Pilotage Amendment Act of 1853 were passed. 
Subsequently thereafter, the Committee’s recommendations were finally followed, 
with the enactment of two Acts.
74
 The first of these was the Merchant Shipping Repeal 
Act of 1854, which repealed all previous Acts relating to pilotage, and the second was 
                                                                                                                                 
65
 Marsden (see Note 54 above) 53, the divided command is a doctrine where the relationship of the 
pilot and master over the vessel is blurred, thus it is said that the “pilot supersedes the master in the 









 Report from the commissioners appointed to inquire into the Laws and Regulations relating to 
Pilotage in the United Kingdom (1836) [56] xxviii referred to in Douglas and Geen (see Note 48 above) 
157. In addition the committee noted that different ports applied different regulations which would be 
completely distinctive from each other, the Committee also recommended that in order to avoid abuses 
by port authorities, that a single body should be created to oversee all the ports regulations. 
71









the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 (“MSA 1854”),
75
 which replaced all the Acts 
dealing with pilotage, specifically Part V dealing with compulsory pilotage.
76
 The 
defence of compulsory pilotage still existed at the time, which was provided by section 
388 of the MSA 1854,
77
 and became one of the agendas in the Select Committee 
meetings examining pilotage in 1870 and 1888, with the view to abolishing the defence 
of compulsory pilotage.
78
 The reasoning inter alia, according to White
79
 who 
contemporaneously proposed the abolition of the defence of compulsory pilotage, was 
in order to promote careful navigation, as the ship-owner would be liable for the pilot’s 
neglect just as though the pilot was an employee. At the time ship-owners were exempt 
from liability because the pilot was not the employee of the ship-owner. The liability of 
the Authority in most instances was rarely in dispute, but if it were to be in dispute, the 
approach for finding liability would be based on the principles of employment, which 
is that the Authority would be liable by virtue of vicarious liability because the pilot 
was an employee of the Authority acting within the course and scope of his 
employment. The recommendation of the committee that the compulsory pilotage 
defence be abolished was ignored by the legislature at the time.  
 
With regards to the jurisdiction of courts to hear claims involving pilots, and therefore, 
where in certain circumstances a collision would occur whilst a vessel was under 





 submits that, although confusion existed about whether 
the Admiralty Court had jurisdiction to hear matters arising out of a collision involving 
a pilot, this was dissipated by the 1873 Supreme Court of Judicature Act, “that gave the 
                                                 
75
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Admiralty Division ‘all the jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice… and a Kings 




After the MSA 1854, several Select Committee meetings were set up in 1860, 1862, 
1870 and 1888, to inquire about the situation of compulsory pilotage, which Douglas 
and Geen
83
 describe as a strong reaction to the defence of compulsory pilotage. 
Thereafter the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 (“MSA 1894”)
84
 was enacted, the 
purpose of which was to repeal and replace the MSA 1854. However, the MSA 1894 




 argued that the state of 
pilotage within the United Kingdom was in an unsatisfactory state particularly with 
regard to the “question of pilotage and exemptions from pilotage”.
87
 Thus in 1911, 
after a report from yet another Committee was released with proposed changes 





 This Act resolved the issues raised in these Committee meetings, such as 
what the legal relationship between the master and pilot was and the abolition of the 




2.4.2 United Kingdom Pilotage Acts 1913 and 1983 
On the 1
st
 of February 1913, the United Kingdom acceded to the Convention For The 
Unification Of Certain Rules Of Law With Respect To Collisions Between Vessels 
(“Collision Convention”),
91
 which was concerned with the “uniform rules of law with 
respect to collisions”.
92
 According to Article 5, “the liability imposed by the preceding 
Articles
93
 attaches in cases where the collision is caused by the fault of a pilot, even 




 Douglas and Geen (see Note 48 above) 161 
84
 The Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 [57 &58 Vict. c. c. 60], available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/57-58/60/enacted, accessed on 5 May 2013. 
85
 ibid, section 633  
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 The United Kingdom’s Pilotage Act of 1913, c 31 
89
 Douglas and Geen (see Note 48 above) 161 
90
 ibid 160 
91
 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law with Respect to Collisions between Vessels 
signed on 23 September 1910 adopted in Brussels, Belgium, available at 




 ibid, this refers to Articles 3 and Article 4, which state the following, Article 3: “If the collision is 
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when the pilot is carried by compulsion of law.”
94
 The signing of this convention 
played a pivotal role in the change of liability regime from one where the ship-owner 
was not liable for the actions of the pilot to the situation where the ship-owner was 




The PA 1913 was enacted in order to give effect to the provisions of the Collision 
Convention. The most important change brought about by the PA 1913 was the 
abolition of the defence of compulsory pilotage.
96
 This essentially placed compulsory 
pilotage in the same situation as that of voluntary pilotage because ship-owners were 
now liable for any actions performed by the pilot whilst under compulsory pilotage, 
even though the pilot was the employee of the pilotage authority and not the ship-
owner.
97
 Douglas and Geen,
98
 however, submit that this Act “did not include any 
provision altering or defining the legal relationship between master and pilot”.
99
 The 
relationship between the master and the pilot will be explored in greater depth in 
Chapter 3.    
 
The PA 1983 repealed and replaced the PA 1913 as well as the Merchant Shipping Act 
of 1979 (“MSA 1979”),
100
 which was enacted after the PA 1913. The PA 1983 
followed along the lines of the PA 1913 by including the provision that a ship-owner 
will no longer be exempt from liability for the actions of the pilot and accordingly will 
be liable for the actions of the pilot as though the pilot had been employed voluntarily 
by the ship-owner.
101
 This exemption is provided for in section 35 of the PA 1983, 
which states the following:  
 
                                                                                                                                 
caused by the fault of one of the vessels, liability to make good the damages attaches to the one which 
has committed the fault” and Article 4: “If two or more vessels are in fault the liability of each vessel is 
in proportion to the degree of the faults respectively committed. Provided that if, having regard to the 
circumstances, it is not possible to establish the degree of the respective faults, or if it appears that the 
faults are equal, the liability is apportioned equally.” 
94
 ibid Article 5  
95
 Gaskell et al (see Note 10 above) 352 
96
 ibid; Bederman (see Note 16 above) 1061 
97
 PA 1913 (see Note 88 above), section 15 
98




 The Merchant Shipping Act of 1979, c. 39. This Act established a pilotage commission to deal with 
pilotage in general. 
101
 PA 1983 (see Note 36 above), section 35; the pilot however, is still considered to be the employee of 
the Authority whilst performing his duties as a compulsory pilot.  
 
 23 
“Notwithstanding anything in any public or local Act, the owner or master of a 
vessel navigating under circumstances in which pilotage is compulsory shall 
be answerable for any loss or damage caused by the vessel or by any fault of 





This section above is particularly relevant in the South African context, as it was 
analysed in the case of the MV Stella Tingas.
103
 An important feature of the PA 1983 
was that it made it an offence to fail to employ the services of a pilot; following along 
the lines of the previous Acts of 1913 and the Merchant Shipping Act of 1979 (“MSA 
1979”)
104
 in this regard.
105
 In addition to this, the PA 1983 was particularly important 
as it made provision for the limitation of the authority’s vicarious liability.
106
 Section 
17 of the Act provided that:  
 
“The grant or renewal of a licence to a pilot by a pilotage [A]uthority under 
the powers given to them by this Act does not impose any liability on the 




The authority could also limit its liability, for “neglect or want of skill of the pilot,” 
and for neglect or want of skill “by the authority in employing the pilot” according to 
section 42(1) of the PA 1983, to an amount not exceeding £100 as well as the pilotage 




Subsequently thereafter, a further Act was passed, namely, the PA 1987,
109
 which is 
not relevant in the South African context because in looking to section 6 of AJRA, the 
courts will only apply English law as it was immediately prior to the enactment of 
AJRA, which is 1 November 1983. Thus the courts will not apply the PA 1987. 
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However, with regards to compulsory pilotage, the PA 1987 has not changed any 
features, particularly with respect to the incidence of liability of either the ship-owner 
or the Authority, from the previous PA 1913 and 1983. Thus according to the PA 1987, 
section 16
110
 regulates the liability of the ship-owner, who will be liable for the actions 
of the pilot and, section 22(8)
111
 regulates the liability of the Authority, which will not 
be liable for the actions of the pilot. Section 22(3), however, does make substantial 
changes to the amounts of limitation of liability available both to the pilot and the 
competent harbour authority.
112
 Section 22(3) provides the following: 
 
“Where, without any such personal act or omission by a competent harbour 
authority as is mentioned in Article 4 of the Convention [on Limitation of 
Liability for Maritime Claims], any loss or damage to any ship, to any 
property on board any ship or to any property or rights of any kind is caused 
by an authorised pilot employed by it, the authority shall not be liable to 
damages beyond the amount of £1,000 multiplied by the number of authorised 




Accordingly, the PA 1987 has increased the amount of liability from £100, together 
with the pilotage charges for that particular voyage, to £1000 multiplied by the number 
of authorised pilots. Thus in following the Convention on Limitation of Liability for 
Maritime Claims (“LLMC”),
114
 particularly Article 4, the PA 1987 has not only capped 
the liability of the authority but has also set out the requirements for which the limits of 
liability can be broken.
115
 In order to break these limits, the burden of proof rests upon 
                                                 
110
 ibid, section 16 states the following: “The fact that a ship is being navigated in an area and in 
circumstances in which pilotage is compulsory for it shall not affect any liability of the owner or master 
of the ship for any loss or damage caused by the ship or by the manner in which it is navigated.” 
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111
 ibid, section 22(8) states that “A competent harbour authority shall not be liable for any loss or 
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 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims signed on the 19th of November 1976 





vJ3KTQ&sig2=mPs7sZOXsAxGFYP38PZGYQ&bvm=bv.57155469,d.ZG4, accessed on 9 November 
2013. 
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 Britannia News Conventions ‘Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (LLMC), 
1976’, Number 3, June 2011 available at: 
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the claimant alleging that the authority cannot rely on the limitation set.
116
 According 
to Article 4 of the LLMC, which provides that: 
 
“A person liable shall not be entitled to limit his liability if it is proved that the 
loss resulted from his personal act or omission, committed with the intent to 





This limit, according to the Britannia News Conventions,
118
 is virtually unbreakable 
due to the elements set out in this Article of the LLMC, namely, a personal act or 
omission, intentional or reckless conduct and, knowledge that loss would probably 
ensue.   
 
2.5 Compulsory Pilotage in South Africa 
The focus of the dissertation is on the NPA, which is a relatively new Act in South 
Africa, as it is the current legislation applicable to compulsory pilotage. It will be 
explored with reference to the relevant sections pertaining to compulsory pilotage. 
However, before this examination can be done, an exploration of the SATS Act will be 
performed due to the fact that compulsory pilotage was governed primarily by the 
SATS Act, which regulated all compulsory pilotage ports before the enactment of the 
NPA. The relevant provisions of the SATS Act have now been repealed by the NPA.119 
 
This section of the chapter, therefore will examine the relevant sections in the SATS 
Act, which existed prior to the enactment of the NPA, as they are necessary in order to 
understand the liability for the pilot’s actions, and this chapter will briefly deal with the 
relevant cases leaving a more detailed examination of these cases to Chapter 4. 
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2013. 
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However before this examination is done, a brief account will be given to the state of 
compulsory pilotage before the SATS Act came into force.  
 
At common law, the ship-owner was not liable for the actions of the pilot.
120
 This view 
finds support in the case of Table Bay Harbour Board v City Line Ltd,
121
 where the 
courts found that the ship-owners were not liable by virtue of English law, specifically 
section 388 of the United Kingdom’s MSA 1854,
122
 which exempted ship-owners from 
liability for the actions of pilots. The issue before the court was whether a local by-
law
123
 that regulated the port of Table Bay, which placed liability on the master and 
owners for damages although it did not mention whether this applied where the vessel 
was under compulsory pilotage, could override the application of section 388.
124
 The 
court per Hopley J concluded that by virtue of the provisions of Cape Statute 8 of 1979 
it was required to apply English law to the matter, specifically section 388 of the MSA 
1852, although the Court recognized that this section merely made clear the position 
that applied under English common law. Hopley J held that: 
 
“…a ship, while under compulsory pilotage within the jurisdiction of this 
Court, would be similarly exempt from liability unless there be some statute in 
force at the place when the damage is done to deprive the owners of such ship 




Having found that the by-law in question did not alter the position the Court found in 
favour of the defendants.  
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Thus it is clear that at common law the ship-owner was exempt from liability for the 
pilot’s actions performed during compulsory pilotage. The SATS Act did not contain 
any provisions which altered the law on this issue. 
 
2.5.1 The SATS Act 
The SATS Act had regulated all the compulsory pilotage ports within South Africa 
since 1989.
126
 It regulated the functions of a pilot as well as the exemption of liability 
of the Authority for the actions of pilots carried out during compulsory pilotage.
127
 
This will be a brief examination as the liability of ship-owners and the Authority will 
be further examined in Chapter 4.  
 
Section 10(7) of the first schedule of the SATS Act states that the “[authority] and the 
pilot shall be exempt from liability for loss or damage caused by a negligent act or 
omission on the part of the pilot.”
128
 Thus the authority will not be liable for any loss 
or damage caused by a pilot’s negligent act or omission. However, the courts in 
numerous cases, where the pilot’s actions went beyond the mere negligent act and 





In addition the liability of ship-owners was examined in the case of the MV Stella 
Tingas. Here the issue before the court was whether a ship-owner of an innocent 
vessel, involved in a collision with another vessel that is under compulsory pilotage at 
the time, would be able to recover damages from either the authority or the ship-owner 
                                                 
126
 The SATS Act (see Note 2 above), section 11 of the first schedule sets out the relevant powers of the 
harbour authority which included: the management of port structures such as lighthouse beacons, 
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likely to become an obstruction or wreck in the harbour.   
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 Banglar Mookh (see Note 3 above) and Yung Chun Fisheries (see Note 4 above). The former case 
the courts found the pilots actions not to be grossly negligent whereas the later case found the actions of 
the pilot to be grossly negligent. In addition the MV Stella Tingas (SCA) (see Note 1 above) also decided 
upon the Authority’s liable, this case is the most important of the cases as it was decided by the SCA and 




of a guilty vessel for actions carried out by the pilot.
130
 The Court concluded that the 
SATS Act did not provide for the liability of ship-owners and thus the courts would 
have to look to the United Kingdom pilotage laws, as discussed above. Regarding the 
ship-owner’s liability, the court concluded that the United Kingdom’s PA 1983 did not 
apply because section 6(2) of AJRA, read with section 10 of the first schedule of the 
SATS Act, precluded the use of section 35 of the PA 1983 and thus the courts had to 
look to the common law of the United Kingdom.
131
 The liability at common law, as 
already stated above, was that the ship-owner was not liable for the actions of the pilot 
whilst the vessel was under compulsory pilotage.
132
 Thus, the owner of the ship was 
not liable for the actions of the pilot.
133
 In addition, the authority was also not liable 
because the pilot’s actions were found not to be grossly negligent and thus the 
exemption provided in section 10(7) of the first schedule applied. 
 
Therefore, according to the SATS Act, if innocent ship-owners were involved in a 
collision with a vessel under compulsory pilotage, the innocent ship-owners would find 
themselves in the unacceptable position of being unable to seek satisfaction from the 
ship-owner of the guilty vessel or the authority. Thus there was a need for change, and 
this was addressed by the NPA. 
 
2.5.2 The NPA  
The NPA was enacted as a solution to the void that had been created by the SATS Act, 
particularly with regard to the liability of ship-owners of vessels that are involved in 
any incidents during navigation of the vessel whilst under compulsory pilotage. 
Following the United Kingdom’s PA,
134
 which placed liability upon the ship-owner of 
the vessel under compulsory pilotage, the NPA included section 76(2). This section 
provides the following: 
 
“Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the pilot is deemed to be the 
servant of the owner or master of the vessel under pilotage and such owner or 
master is liable for the acts or omissions of the pilot.”
135
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The main difference between the above section and the United Kingdom’s PA is that, 
according to the NPA, the pilot is deemed to be the employee of the ship-owner while 
in charge of the vessel whereas, according to the United Kingdom’s PA, the pilot is 
still the employee of the Authority while in charge of the vessel. The significance of 
this will be explored fully in Chapter 3.  
 
Thus, where a vessel under compulsory pilotage is involved in a collision, the ship-
owner will be liable due to the fact that the pilot is automatically deemed to be the 
ship-owner’s employee whilst on board the vessel, even though in reality the pilot is 
the employee of the Authority. However the Authority will not necessarily be liable for 
the actions of its employees. Therefore, a ship-owner of an innocent vessel involved in 
a collision will be able to get satisfaction for damages caused by the collision from the 




Although the legislature saw the need to provide a solution to the above issue created 
by the SATS Act, it needed to also address the liability of the Authority as the Act did 
not sufficiently exempt the Authority from liability in all instances, according to the 
perspective of the Authority, particularly where the pilot’s actions were found to be 
grossly negligent, as had been emphasized in the case of the MV Stella Tingas.
137
 This 
second issue was addressed by including section 76(1) of the NPA, which states that:  
 
“Neither the Authority nor the pilot is liable for loss or damage caused by 
anything done or omitted by the pilot in good faith whilst performing his or 




This section went beyond section 10(7) of the first schedule of the SATS Act by 
including the concept of good faith. Therefore the Authority would not be liable for the 
actions of the pilot carried out in good faith.
139
 The question, however, is whether in 
addressing the problems that had been created by the SATS Act; the legislature had in 
fact created a solution or simply a new problem. This question will be dealt with in 
Chapter 4.  
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Since the inception of the NPA, there have been no cases that have come under 
consideration by the courts; therefore this concept is relatively unknown with regards 
to compulsory pilotage and what good faith entails. The concept of good faith will be 
further discussed in Chapter 4, which deals with the issue of liability of the ship-owner 
and the Authority in greater detail.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
It has been necessary in this chapter to examine the laws of compulsory pilotage of the 
United Kingdom because of section 6 of AJRA. It is clear from the history of the 
United Kingdom that the defence of compulsory pilotage which was previously 
available under certain Acts, had to be abolished. Even though the PA 1913 had 
abolished this defence in the United Kingdom, it still applied in circumstances where 
collisions occurred within South Africa due to the lacuna that had been created by the 
SATS Act not regulating the position of ship-owners’ liability, by the inclusion of a 
provision such as that contained in the PA 1913, which made the ship-owner liable for 
the actions of the compulsory pilot. This lacuna was cured by the enactment of the 
NPA, which deemed the pilot to be the ship-owner’s employee for the purposes of 
compulsory pilotage; thus the ship-owner would be liable for any actions carried out by 
the pilot. Although section 76(2) does not expressly refer to a ‘good faith’ requirement 
there are two possible interpretations of this section.  
 
Firstly, that the ship-owner is liable for the actions or omissions of the pilot, whether 
they are performed in good faith or not. Secondly, that section 76 should be read as a 
whole, meaning that both sub-section (1) and (2) must be read together. The effect of 
this is that where the pilot is acting in good faith, the ship-owner or master will be 
liable for any acts or omissions. This then begs the question as to whether the ship-
owner should also be liable for the actions of the pilot carried out in bad faith. If the 
Authority cannot bring itself within the ambit of section 76(1), for instance where the 
pilot is not acting in good faith, the Authority accordingly cannot rely on this section to 
exempt itself from liability. Therefore in such circumstances the Authority will be 
liable for the acts or omissions of the pilot, as the pilot is in fact the employee of the 
Authority. Whether the ship-owner is jointly liable with the Authority in such cases, 




Another issue is that of the divided command and the circumstances in which a master 
can intervene in the affairs of the pilot while in charge of the vessel under compulsory 
pilotage. Therefore an understanding of the functions of the pilot is very important to 
address this issue. The functions of the pilot and the relationship between the pilot and 

































Current Position of Compulsory Pilotage 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The NPA regulates compulsory pilotage within the jurisdiction of the Authority,
1
 as 
discussed in chapter 2. The focus of this chapter is predominately on these ports and 
not on private ports.
2
 This chapter will explain the pilot’s responsibilities according to 
the NPA and demonstrate how compulsory pilotage generally operates, by analysing 
how the NPA regulates the relationship between the master of a vessel and a 
compulsory pilot. In addition, it will also consider the danger of the divided command, 
which is essentially the way in which the functions of the master and pilot can be 
become blurred creating a double authority. This chapter will analyse the divided 
command by considering the old cases, as far back as the 19
th
 century, which were 





 and the Tactician.
5
 These cases highlighted the dangers of the 
divided command. 
 
Section 75(6) of the NPA provides that a master can intervene in the affairs of the pilot 
when there is an “emergency”.
6
 Despite the fact that the legislature has specified the 
point at which the master may intervene in the affairs of the pilot, it has not clarified or 
defined what constitutes an emergency. This section has however created a dilemma 
for the master, as the law prohibits the master from intervening with the pilot’s orders 
unless there is an emergency.
7
 Nevertheless the master would want to act before an 
emergency occurs to avert any collisions so that the ship-owner will not have to be 
liable for the actions of the pilot as detailed in Chapter 2. It is therefore necessary to 
investigate what an emergency means within the context of compulsory pilotage and 
this chapter will do so by exploring what circumstances will be classified as an 
                                                 
1
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emergency as well as the implications of the master intervening. 
 
The aim of this chapter is therefore to examine the relationship of the pilot and the 
master in more detail, comparing their respective duties whilst the vessel is under 
compulsory pilotage, and examining the situations where the master may intervene in 
the operation of the vessel. This chapter will also consider the practical relevance of 
the master intervening in the operations of the vessel as the ship-owners are now liable 
by law for the actions of the pilot in any event whether the master intervenes or not. In 
contrast to this, the position at common law meant that the ship-owner was not liable 
for the actions of the pilot as the pilot was not the ship-owner’s employee, because he 
was not appointed voluntarily due to the fact that it was a compulsory pilotage port.
8
 
Dealing with the issues of whether the master was independently at fault is important 
in consideration of the fairness of section 76(1) and (2) of the NPA.  
 
3.2 Pilots’ Responsibilities 





 accepts this position as true and to support this view, she 
examined the case of the Andoni,
11
 where the court stated that where a pilot is placed 
on board a vessel, his duties commence at that point.
12
 Although the court in the South 
African case of J.T. Rennie & Sons v Minister of Railways and Harbours (“the 
Inyati”),
13
 did not clarify when pilotage commences, it did however circumscribe the 
duration of pilotage, when it stated in passing that “a pilot is responsible for the 
navigation of a vessel until he leaves the bridge and hands over to the master”.
14
 It is 
only during this period that the pilot has control of the vessel; after the pilot leaves the 
                                                 
8
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The pilot is tasked with the duty to navigate a vessel safely in and out of a harbour. In 
support of this, Gaskell et al
16
 states that the pilot is “charged with the safety of the 
ship, being bound to use diligence and reasonable skill in the exercise of his important 
function”.
17
 The pilot’s role in the vessel is an important one as their expertise and 
specialized knowledge of local rules and customs ensure that a collision does not occur 
or in the very least reduce the likelihood of such a collision occurring.
18
 It is for this 
very reason that most port states protect their interests by making it mandatory for a 
pilot to navigate the vessel into and out of the harbour.
19
 The reasons for protecting 
their interests is due to the fact that the consequences should an allision occur in the 
port where infrastructure such as a berth is damaged, although the ship-owner will be 
liable by virtue of section 76(2) of the NPA, would be costly on the Authority due to 
the inoperability of a berth until it has been re-constructed or fixed, thus losing out on 
profits that they would have been made had the vessel not damaged the berth.
20
 The 
same reason exists with regard to the consequences if the vessel collides with another 
vessel in the port, the damaged vessel would take up space in the port, which could be 




The pilot in ensuring the safety of the vessel has various responsibilities, some of 
which were stated in the Tactician,
22
 where Lord Alverstone, C.J stated that “the pilot 
is in sole charge of the ship, and that all directions as to speed, course, stopping and 
reversing and everything of that kind are for the pilot”.
23
 The responsibilities of the 
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pilot are set out in section 7524 of the NPA, which clearly sets out that a pilot is tasked 
with the functions of navigating the vessel and controlling the movements of the tugs 
whilst the vessel is within the limits of the harbour.
25
 The Port Rules
26
 also reiterate 
these functions of the pilot that are provided for in the NPA. Rule 41 provides the 
following: 
 
“In terms of sections 75(3) to (5) of the Act: 
(a)  The pilot's function is to navigate a vessel in the port; to direct its 
movements and to determine and control the movements of the tugs 
assisting the vessel under pilotage;  
(b)  The pilot must determine the number of tugs required for pilotage with 




Where there is a dispute between the pilot and master about the number of tugs to be 
used, the harbour master will make the final decision.
28
 Therefore the responsibilities 
of the pilot that are set out in the NPA and in the Port Rules are clear and 
unambiguous. The functions of the pilot are in most circumstances not in issue when a 
collision occurs. In most instances what is at dispute is the relationship between the 
master and the pilot in fulfilling the respective roles or, as it has been commonly 




3.3 The Divided Command 
The relationship between a pilot and a master has been said to create what is more 
commonly known as the divided command between the two parties.
30
 The divided 
command has been considered as a dangerous notion as a vessel cannot be said to have 
two persons who are primarily in charge of the vessel, as this would cause confusion 




 best describes the danger by using the 
example of a car when driven at the same time by the husband and the wife who is 
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sitting beside him. He suggests that this is a cause of disaster and that conflict would 
unsurprisingly ensue. This view can be supported by looking at the case of the 
Peerless
33
 where Dr. Lushington stated that, “if we encourage such interfering [by the 
master], we should have a double authority on board, a divisum imperium, the parent of 





It is in this regard that the responsibilities and roles of the master and the pilot need to 
be clearly distinguished, so as to avoid the situation that Dr. Lushington had warned 
against in the Peerless. Douglas and Geen
35
 submit that: 
 
“The legal relationship between the master and the pilot is based on principles, 
which are contradictory: 
i) That division of authority is inimical to the safety of navigation; 
ii)  That the pilot, by definition, has the conduct of the ship; 
iii) That the master, by definition, has command or charge of the ship, a 




They further submit that these inconsistencies can only be overcome once ii and iii 
above have been differentiated. Quick
37
 states that the relationship between the master 
and the pilot can be best described if there is a distinction between power and 
authority. He explains this by stating that:  
 
“Power can be defined as the ability to act without regard to the right to act, 
while authority can be described as the right to act without regard to the means 
or ability to complete the act. At sea the master has both the power and the 
authority over the ship and its crew, but on entering pilotage waters the 
authority to direct and control the movement of the ship shifts by operation of 




In agreement with this, Dawson
39
 submits that “there must be a balance between the 
pilot’s peculiar knowledge of the port and its local conditions and the master’s 
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knowledge of the idiosyncrasies of the vessel”.
40
 He further submits that this balance is 
skewed in favour of the pilot and his employers.  
 
It is clear that the situations that Dr. Lushington warns against must not be allowed to 
occur, and the way in which to prevent this, as Douglas and Geen
41
 suggest, is to make 
sure that the roles and functions of the pilot and master are clearly set out. The NPA 
does this by distinguishing the roles of the master and the pilot by stating that the 
master shall remain in command of the vessel whilst the vessel is under pilotage, but 
he must however assist the pilot in carrying out his duties.
42
 Therefore it can be seen 
that the role of the pilot has changed from a pilot being in command over the vessel to 
an advisory role.
43
 Dawson submits that the role between the pilot and the master is 
better described through the maxim of “masters command, pilot’s advice”, although he 
is of the view that the role of pilot is more than that of an advisory role.
44
 His reasoning 
for this view emerges from the fact that the pilot has sole control over the navigation of 




In addition to the NPA distinguishing the roles of the master and pilot, rule 44 of the 
Port Rules sets out the ways in which the master can provide assistance to the pilot.
46
 It 
states that, “the master of the vessel must ensure that the officers and crew are at their 
posts, that a proper lookout is kept and that the pilot is given all assistance necessary in 
the execution of his or her duties”.
47
 This list is not a closed list of ways in which the 
master and crew can assist the pilot; it mainly sets out the most important ways that the 




The relationship between the master and pilot is therefore one of a complicated nature. 
The master is primarily in command of the vessel whilst the pilot is navigating; 




 Douglas and Geen (see Note 35 above) 668 
42
 Kay et al (see Note 8 above) 444; The NPA (see Annexure A), section 75(6) 
43
 Dawson (see Note 39 above) 1 
44
 ibid 1; Douglas and Geen (see Note 35 above) 662 
45
 Dawson ibid 1 
46
 The Port Rules (see Note 26 above), Rule 44 
47
 The NPA (see Annexure A), section 75(6) and section 75(8); The Port Rules ibid, Rule 43 and 44  
48




however, during the navigation period, the pilot is in charge of vessel with the 
assistance of the master and crew of the vessel.
49
 The words ‘in command over’ and ‘in 
charge’, as discussed above, can be distinguished by reference to the terms ‘power’ and 
‘authority’. The master who is in command of a vessel has both the power and the 
authority over a vessel generally whilst at sea, however when the vessel is within the 
port, the authority aspect shifts from the master to the pilot. The power remains with 
the master at all times. Section 75(7)
50
 of the NPA also assists with differentiating the 
roles of the master and the pilot. It does this by adding a requirement that the master 
must first inform the pilot before he intervenes. In addition, the master must also 
permit the pilot, after the emergency has been averted, to proceed with the execution of 
his duties.    
 
The master as already mentioned, must assist the pilot in his duties and is always in 
command of the vessel; however, he cannot intervene in the affairs of the pilot unless 
there is an emergency.
51
 Before an examination of what constitutes an emergency can 
be undertaken, the circumstances and case law that discusses the circumstances in 
which the master can intervene will be analysed.   
 
3.3.1 The circumstances in which the master may intervene with the affairs of 





 the pilot was seen as the commander of the vessel during his 
charge and the pilot’s orders had to be obeyed by the master. Thus the master could not 
interfere with the orders of the pilot save for instances where the pilot was said to be 
“incompetent to discharge his office”.
53
 This however caused numerous problems 
because if the master did not obey the orders of the pilot and a collision ensued, the 
owners of the vessel were liable; the same could be said where the master intervened in 
the duties of the pilot.
54
 Douglas and Geen
55
 state that there was essentially a double 
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edged sword with which the owner’s compulsory pilotage defence
56
 could be 
destroyed; on the one hand, if the master intervenes without good reason, the owner 
will be liable, whilst, on the other hand, if the master fails to intervene to avert danger, 
the owner will be liable in this instance as well. 
 
This position changed in the Argo,
57
 where the court stated that “a master has no right 
to interfere with the pilot, except in cases of the pilot’s intoxication or manifest 
incapacity, or in cases of danger which the pilot does not foresee, or in cases of great 
necessity”.
58
 Thus, there was a move away from the absolute powers of the pilot whilst 
he was in charge of the vessel, to a few circumstances in which the master could 
intervene. The starting point in considering what these circumstances are is to look at 
the old English cases that expounded upon instances where the master ought to have 
interfered in order to avert danger.  
 
The finding in the case of the Prinses Juliana
59
 was that the master was liable where he 
interfered with the instructions of a pilot without just cause.
60
 The facts of case being 
that the Prinses Juliana, which was entering the Harwich harbour area, and the 
Esbjerg, which was leaving, collided; both vessels were under compulsory pilotage at 
the time of the collision.
61
 According to local by-laws, the vessel leaving the harbour 
should ease speed or stop if need be, to allow a vessel which is entering to pass clear of 
it.
62
 The Esbjerg did not do this, and the master of the Prinses Juliana seeing that a 
collision might occur, took charge of the vessel away from the pilot to try and avert a 
collision from occurring; unfortunately the master then gave the wrong orders in the 




Bucknill J stated that, “if the master sees fit to take the navigation out of the hands of 
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 ibid at 688 
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the pilot and countermands his orders, he must satisfy the court that he was justified in 
so doing”.
64
 He stated that the master of the Prinses Juliana in countermanding the 
orders of the pilot did so in the belief that a collision would ensue and so acted to avoid 
such collision, in order to avoid loss of life to the passengers and crew on board the 
vessel. However, these actions were wrong in the circumstances.
65
 Bucknill J found 
that although the master of the Prinses Juliana took the wrong actions, ultimately 
causing the collision, it was “the negligence of the Esbjerg [that] contributed to the 
collision, because it was her negligent proximity which led the master of the Prinses 




The principles of intervention were discussed in the case of the Lochlibo. The issue 
before the court was whether the master in the Lochlibo should have intervened to 
avoid a collision that occurred as a result of the pilot colliding with the Aberfoyle, 
which was anchored at the time of the collision.
67
 Dr. Lushington stated that in order 
for the owners of the Lochlibo to escape liability, the “onus probandi” rested upon 
them to establish either that the Lochlibo was not to blame or that the pilot in charge of 
the Lochlibo at the time was the sole cause of the collision.
68
 He went on to state the 
following:  
 
“…[courts ought not to] sanction the interference of the master in any way in 
the performance of those duties which the pilot must be considered more 
peculiarly competent to discharge, and of which the master, in the majority of 
cases, must be a very inferior judge. I do not of course in these observations 
intend to go the extraordinary length of saying that under no possible state of 
circumstances is the master justified in interfering with the pilot. If the latter 
was utterly incompetent to the proper discharge of his duties, it would clearly 
be incumbent upon the master to interfere for the protection of the lives and of 
the property on board his vessel. Such, however, would be a case of extreme 
necessity… I am clearly of opinion that it was entirely within the province of 
the pilot to determine whether the vessel should proceed or not, and that the 





Dr. Lushington found that in the circumstances that the Aberfoyle was “not to blame 
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for the collision, as she was anchored in a proper situation; that she was not bound, 
being so anchored, to have kept a light fixed; and that she exhibited a light as soon as 
the Lochlibo was seen”.
 70
 In addition he found that the pilot of the Lochlibo was not 
exclusively to blame for [the collision]… but that there was undue interference with 
him on the part of the master and crew of the Lochlibo”.
71
 The owners of the Lochlibo 
had not established that the Lochlibo was not at fault or that the pilot was the sole 
cause of the collision; therefore they could escape liability for the collision that 
occurred.
72





Thus the view that a master could not intervene at all in terms of common law has 
changed considerably over time. It became permissible for a master to intervene but 
only in certain circumstances, and if such master did not intervene where he ought to 
have, he would be disregarding his duties to assist the pilot.  
 
This was the point that was made in the Tactician,
74
 which concerned an appeal from 
the court a quo. The Tactician, which was under compulsory pilotage at the time, 
collided with the Leander that was at anchor.
75
 The master of the Tactician had not 
drawn the pilot’s attention to certain lights, which the master had observed.
76
 Lord 
Alverstone C.J stated that it is the duty of the master to call to the attention of the pilot 
any obstacles that may arise where the vessel will be at risk of being involved in a 
collision, and the master will be disregarding his duties to assist the pilot in navigating 
the vessel if he fails to do so.
77
 He agreed with the arguments of the counsel for the 
appellants, who emphasized that, “to encourage interference with the pilot in the 
performance of his duties would lead to grave and disastrous consequences”.
78
 He 
further submitted that a “distinction [should be made] between interference and 
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bringing to the pilot’s notice anything which the pilot ought to know”.
79
 The court 
dismissed the appeal, finding that the master was the sole cause of the collision as he 
could have averted the risk of collision with the stationary vessel if he had made his 
anxieties known to the pilot; had he done so and the pilot did not use this information 




Thus it is clear from the cases discussed above that there is a resonating argument 
throughout these cases, that the master shall not interfere with the duties of the pilot 
unless there is good reason for doing so, such as the incompetence of the pilot in his 
ability to carry out his duties, or necessity in order to prevent loss of life of the 
passengers and crew aboard the vessel.  
 
In South Africa, the issue of when a master can intervene is stipulated in the NPA, 
where section 75(6) of the NPA provides that the master may intervene “to preserve 
the safety of the vessel, cargo or crew and take whatever action he or she considers 
reasonably necessary to avert the danger”.
81
 It is clear from the wording of section 
75(6) that the point at which the master can intervene with the affairs of the pilot is 
when there is an “emergency”.
82





 reiterates this point by stating that the master can interfere with the duties of the 
pilot and resume his duties in order to protect the interests of his owners as well as 
everyone concerned, when there is an emergency. He further provides the instances 
which could be classified as an emergency, these being: 
 
“In cases of great danger, which the pilot does not foresee, or great necessity; -
and in cases of obvious danger, where it is clear either that the pilot has 
become incompetent to command, from sudden illness, or from intoxication, 
or from any other cause; or that he is acting in such a manner or steering such 
a course as would cause the certain destruction of the ship and endanger the 
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 ibid at 251 
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81
 The NPA (see Annexure A), section 75(6), The Port Rules (see Note 26 above), Rule 43(c)  
82
 The NPA ibid 
83
 ibid, does not define what an emergency is in section 1 of the definition section 
84





In the case of the Inyati, Hathorn J
86
 asked the question, where the emergency was.
87
 
The facts of the case were that the Inyati was leaving Durban harbour under 
compulsory pilotage when it collided with a tug, the Richard King, whose purpose was 
to escort the pilot off the ship and back to the confines of the harbour.
88
 Hathorn J 
stated that he did not think that the order ‘“full speed astern hard a starboard’ [could be 





Gardiner A.J. whose judgment was read by Carter, J, found that the Richard King was 
not negligent in its actions to try and avoid the imminent collision, even though the 
collision still occurred, and thus it was not responsible for the collision. The court 
unanimously held that the Inyati was the sole cause of the collision.
90
 Gardiner A.J 
reasoned that: 
 
“We are satisfied that the effect of the order "full speed astern hard a-
starboard," in the position in which the "Inyati" was then relative to the tug, 
and at the speed at which she was going, was to involve collision or imminent 
risk thereof, Lindsay, by proceeding to this position at an unusual speed 
brought upon himself the giving of this order, the effect of the order was to 
involve collision or imminent risk thereof, and we are therefore forced to the 
conclusion that for the accident which occurred about a minute after the order 




Gardiner, A.J. held that the master of the Inyati was not negligent in not interfering 
with the pilot’s order. He looked to the case of the Tactician as authority for his 
finding, stating that a master who does not “countermand or remonstrate against the 
unseamanlike orders of the pilot” where the pilot is in his sound and sober mind would 
not be responsible for the actions of the pilot.
92
 If he were to go against the orders of 
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 ibid at 415 
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The NPA, according to section 76(2), deems the pilot to be the employee of the ship-
owner, whereas the position at common law, of the United Kingdom, was that the pilot 
remained the employee of the Authority.
94
 The significance of this difference is that 
where the pilot’s actions are the cause of an incident, the ship-owner is liable by virtue 
of the NPA, which essentially means that ship-owners will be vicariously liable for the 
actions of the pilot as he is considered to be the servant of the ship-owner for the 
duration of compulsory pilotage. Thus the question of whether the master should 
intervene at all is merely an academic one in terms of liability, due to the fact that the 
ship-owner is now liable in any event whether the master intervenes or not.
95
 This 
situation has therefore created a dilemma for the masters of vessels who generally will 




 submits that: 
 
“The master’s concern not to contravene the statutory prohibition unless there 
is an emergency might cause him or her to refrain from countermanding the 
pilot’s orders until it is too late to avert damage. If the master fails to interfere 
in an emergency, timeously or at all, he or she may be found to have been at 
fault for such failure. If the master intervenes to interfere with the pilot’s 
control of navigation prematurely, he or she may be in contravention of the 





Accordingly, the argument made by Hare could lead to a situation where the master of 
a vessel might not intervene in the affairs of the pilot until an emergency situation 
occurs and a collision could occur when it could have been avoided if the master had 
intervened before an emergency occurred and not necessarily when the vessel was 
already in the precarious situation.  
 
3.4 Noting up of the 19
th
 century cases 
Although Chapter 3 examines mainly the 19
th
 century English cases, these cases are 
still applicable as the principles that have been decided upon can be used as guidance. 
In addition, none of the decisions have been overturned. These cases will be noted up 
in order to show that the principles are still relevant with regards to the current position 
of compulsory pilotage. 
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It is clear that, although the relationship between the master and the pilot is 
complicated in nature, the NPA now provides that the master is at all times in 
command of the vessel. However, whilst the pilot is on board the vessel performing his 
duties, the master and crew must assist the pilot to ensure the safe navigation of the 
vessel into and out of the harbour. It is clear that the NPA has followed the idea that a 
master may not intervene in the affairs of the pilot from the old English cases. 
However it has clarified the situation where the master can intervene, this being in an 
emergency. It would seem that the reason the legislature omitted to define what an 
emergency would entail is that it wished to leave the scope of what an emergency 
could be open to interpretation due to the fact that there can be no closed list of 
emergencies.  
 
The NPA not only governs the position of when a master can intervene in the affairs of 
the pilot, it also deals with the aspect of liability, whereby the ship-owners will now be 
liable for actions or omission of the pilot while performing his duties in good faith. 





















Limitation of Liability 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will consider the extent of the liability of ship-owners whose vessels have 
been involved in a collision whilst their vessels are under compulsory pilotage. This 
chapter is the most important aspect of the dissertation as it looks mainly at the concept 
of liability in situations where collisions occur when the vessel is under compulsory 
pilotage within the jurisdiction of the Authority. In order to do this, it will examine 
section 76(2) of the NPA, which deals specifically with liability of ship-owners. 
According to this section, the owner of the vessel that is under the control of the pilot 
will be liable for the actions of the pilot. This chapter also will examine the potential 
unfairness of the situation that is created, as the owner is statutorily obliged to make 
use of the services of the pilot within the Authority’s jurisdiction as though the owner 
had voluntarily employed the use of the pilot.  
 
In addition, this chapter will also explore the situations in which the Authority will be 
liable for actions of the pilot. This exploration will be undertaken by examining three 
different concepts; namely the concept of gross negligence; the concept of intention; 
and the concept of good faith. The reason for examining these concepts is due to the 
cases, which will be examined in great depth further in this chapter, which interpreted 
the exemption provision in section 10(7) of the first schedule of the SATS Act, which 
excluded either grossly negligent or intentional actions of the pilot. If the pilot’s 
actions were found to be either grossly negligent or intentional then the Authority 
could not rely on this provision to exclude its liability. Therefore, it is necessary to 
establish whether the concept of good faith, in terms of section 76(1) of the NPA, 
would also exclude either gross negligence or intentional actions. These concepts will 
be set out in the following way:  
 
The first concept, which is gross negligence, will be examined with reference to case 
law, in order to determine its meaning as well as to understand how the courts have 
distinguished between gross negligence and dolus eventualis. As already discussed in 
Chapter 2, prior to the enactment of the NPA, the SATS Act regulated compulsory 
pilotage. According to section 10(7) of the first schedule of the SATS Act, “the 
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Company and the pilot shall be exempt from liability for loss or damage caused by a 
negligent act or omission on the part of the pilot”.
1
 This section of the SATS Act was 
examined in the case of the MV Stella Tingas
2
 where Scott JA held that “the exemption 
[in section 10(7) of the first schedule] would not apply if the pilot were found to have 
been grossly negligent”.
3
 Therefore in order for Authority to incur liability for actions 
caused by the pilot, gross negligence on the part of the pilot needed to be proved, and 
thus the meaning and scope of gross negligence needed to be further developed within 
the context of compulsory pilotage.  
 
Along with the MV Stella Tingas, the cases of the Yung Chun Fishery,
4
 and the MV 
Banglar Mookh
 5
 have also dealt with the issue of gross negligence within the context 
of compulsory pilotage under the SATS Act, and these cases will be dealt with in more 
detail in this chapter so as to illustrate how the courts have dealt with exemption 
clauses within the context of compulsory pilotage. 
 
The second concept that will be examined is intentional acts, which will be 
investigated by distinguishing the different types of intentional acts, namely dolus 
directus, dolus indirectus and dolus eventualis. The section will also enquire as to what 
recklessness entails with reference to case law in order to ascertain how the courts have 
defined recklessness and the difference between dolus eventualis and recklessness.  
 
The last concept that will be elucidated is the concept of good faith, which will be 
examined in two ways, namely by providing the ordinary dictionary meaning of good 
faith and by examining the concept of good faith with reference to case law which has 
been expounded upon in other areas of law such as the law of contract and maritime 
insurance in order to ascertain its meaning and its application. This section will attempt 
to assess whether the concept of good faith should exclude acts of gross negligence. 
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 Legal Succession To The South African Transport Services Act 9 of 1989, section 10(7) of the first 
schedule 
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 MV Stella Tingas; Transnet Ltd t/a Portnet v Owners of the MV Stella Tingas and Another 2003 (2) 
SA 473 (SCA) 
3
 ibid at 480 para 7B 
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 The MFV Yung Chun No 17: Yung Chun Fishery Company Limited v Transnet Limited t/a Portnet 
(Reportable as WCC case No AC 30/97, 1 September 2000), available at: 
http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/shiplaw/fulltext/yungchun.pdf, accessed on 25 June 2013. 
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This chapter of the dissertation will consider ways in which the situation of perceived 
unfairness, of placing liability of a ship-owner for making use of a pilot which is 
statutorily placed on him, can be remedied, as well as examine the position of the 
United Kingdom and how it makes use of compulsory pilotage, more specifically in 
relation to its treatment of the liability of the ship-owners. 
 
4.2 Liability on the Ship-Owner  
As discussed in Chapter 2; according to the common law of compulsory pilotage in the  
United Kingdom, a ship-owner was not liable for the acts of the pilot that were carried 
out during the compulsory pilotage period. Kay
6
 submits the following reasons that the 
ship-owner was not liable: 
 
“…that wherever the employment of a pilot is by law compulsory, that is to 
say, wherever a statutory penalty is incurred if a pilot is not employed, the 
owners and masters are not liable for injuries arising solely from the acts of 
such pilot so employed; as the Courts consider it unjust to hold the owners and 
master responsible for the skill, sobriety and caution of one whom they have 





He further proposes that in order for ship-owners to avail themselves of this 
exemption, a burden would be placed upon them to prove that two requirements 
existed; the first being that the pilot must have been employed compulsorily at the time 
that the loss or damage occurred, and the second being that the pilot must have been 
the sole cause of the loss or damage.
8
 Thus where a master or crew in any degree 
contributed to the loss or damage, the ship-owner would be liable for such loss or 
damage.
9
 This is supported in the case of the Maria,
10
 which came before Dr. 
Lushington in the United Kingdom’s High Court of Admiralty where it was held that 
“the owner of a ship is not responsible in proceedings in rem for damage done by his 
ship, occasioned solely by default of a licensed pilot employed by compulsion of 
                                                 
6
 Kay J et al ‘The Law Relating to Shipmasters Seamen: Their Appointment Duties Powers Rights and 
Liabilities’ 2
nd 
ed 1 (London: Stevens And Haynes, 1894) Chapter XII, available at: 




 ibid 448; David J Bederman ‘Compulsory Pilotage, Public Policy, and the Early Private International 
Law of Torts’ 64 (1989-1990) Tul. L. Rev. 1033 1989-1990 at 1052; The Mobile (1856) 14 ER 568 
9
 Kay et al (see Note 6 above) 448; Bederman ibid 1052; the liability of the master will be determined 
later in this chapter. 
10





 This position changed with the enactment of the of the PA 1913, which 
abolished the defence of compulsory pilotage, making the ship-owner liable for any 
damages caused while the vessel was under compulsory pilotage.
12
 Thus it is clear that 
the ship-owner is liable for damages caused by the vessel during compulsory pilotage 
in the United Kingdom. 
 
In South Africa, however, the position of liability of the ship-owner was less clear than 
that of the United Kingdom. At common law the ship-owners were not liable by virtue 
of English law, specifically section 388 of the United Kingdom’s MSA 1854,
13
 which 
exempted ship-owners from liability for the actions of pilots; which was discussed at 
length in Chapter 2. However, the MSA 1854 could no longer be applied in South 
Africa by virtue of the fact that the SATS Act was the applicable law to be applied in 
all matters pertaining to compulsory pilotage, according to section 6 of AJRA.  
 
The SATS Act, however, did not cater for the liability of ship-owners; therefore, it was 
left to the courts to decide whether or not a ship-owner would be liable for the actions 
of the pilot during the period that the pilot was in charge of the vessel. The courts in 
determining the ship-owner’s liability stated that according to section 6 of AJRA, 
English law should be considered in order to ascertain the liability of ship-owners. 
Thus in the case of the MV Stella Tingas,
14
 which concerned an appeal from the court a 
quo,
15
 where the owners of the MV Stella Tingas had brought an action in rem against 
the owners of the Atlantica and an action in personam against the Authority.
16
 Booysen 
J, in the court a quo, held that the Authority was liable because the pilot’s action 
equated to gross negligence. However, with regard to the owners of the MV Stella 
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 The Maria ibid; The Annapolis and the Johanna Stoll [1861] 167 ER 1 28 at 128 
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 NJJ Gaskell, C Debattista and RJ Swatton ‘Chorley and Giles’ Shipping Law’ 8th ed, (1987) 352 
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 The Merchant Shipping Act 1854 [17 & 18 Vict. c. 104], available at: 
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16
 MV Stella Tingas (SCA) (see Note 2 above) at 478 
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Tingas’ claim against the owners of the Atlantica, Booysen J concluded that the 




The Authority appealed against the order. The liability of the Authority will however 
be examined later in this chapter.
18
 The owners of the MV Stella Tingas in reply to the 
Authority’s appeal brought a counter appeal against the owners of the Atlantica, which 
was conditional upon the Authority succeeding in its appeal against the MV Stella 
Tingas.
19
 This aspect of the ship-owner’s liability will now be addressed. 
 
The facts before the court of appeal were that the Atlantica, which was being 
transported into the harbour by a compulsory pilot, namely Captain Buffard, collided 
with the MV Stella Tingas, which was berthed alongside loading cargo at Island View 
berth 3.
20
 The plaintiffs, the owners of the MV Stella Tingas, averred that the ship-
owners of the Atlantica were liable for the damages caused, on two grounds, the first 
being that the collision was caused by the negligence of the pilot and accordingly 
section 35 of the United Kingdom’s PA 1983 applied in the circumstances.
21
 Section 
35 of the PA is as follows:  
 
“Notwithstanding anything in any public or local Act, the owner or master of a 
vessel navigating under circumstances in which pilotage is compulsory shall 
be answerable for any loss or damage caused by the vessel or by any fault of 
the navigation of the vessel in the same manner as he would if pilotage were 
not compulsory.”
22
   
 
Scott JA, in determining whether English law applied in the circumstances, analysed 
section 35 of the PA and the English common law, where the defence of compulsory 
pilotage
23
 existed, as well as section 10 of the first schedule of the SATS Act. Scott JA 
concluded that a distinction had to be made between the English laws, both the PA and 
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 ibid at 478 para 1B 
21
 ibid at 478 para 2E 
22
 The United Kingdom’s Pilotage Act, 1983 c. 21, available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1983/21/pdfs/ukpga_19830021_en.pdf, accessed on 25 June 2013, 
section 35 
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 A ship-owner will not be liable for the actions of the pilot due to the fact that the ship-owners were 
forced by compulsion of law to make use of the pilot in order to enter or leave the harbour. 
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the common law, and the SATS Act.
24
 He reasoned that according to English laws the 
pilot was considered to be the employee of the ship-owner at all times, including the 
compulsory pilotage phase, whereas the pilot according to the SATS Act was expressly 
stated to be the employee of the ship-owner during compulsory pilotage.
25
 He held that 
according to this distinction, the provisions of the SATS Act: 
 
“…are wholly inconsistent with the position in England where the pilot, 
whether voluntary or compulsory, is pro hac vice the ship-owner's servant… It 
follows that the effect of s 6(2) of [AJRA], read with [section] 10 of the First 
Schedule to the Succession Act, is to preclude the application of s 35 of the 




In agreement with the court’s findings regarding the application of the United 
Kingdom’s PA 1983, Adams and Adams
27
 state that in addition the PA did not apply 
outside the geographical territory of the United Kingdom, therefore section 35 of the 
PA did not apply in these circumstances. 
 
The second ground upon which the ship-owners of the MV Stella Tingas relied was 
that the master of the Atlantica was negligent for not interfering with the affairs of the 
pilot, in order to prevent the collision from occurring.
28
 As was discussed in Chapter 3 
of the dissertation, a master can only intervene with the affairs of the pilot were there is 
an emergency. This was reiterated in this case as Scott JA, using the case of the 
Tactician
29
 as authority, stated that in the circumstances the master of the Atlantica 
was not negligent by reason of not intervening in the pilot’s affairs.
30
 In addition, he 
concluded that the master did not foresee an emergency occurring and even if he did, 
any actions that the master could have taken would not have averted the danger from 
ensuing.
31
 Therefore, the owners of the Atlantica were not liable for the damages that 
had occurred during compulsory pilotage and the counter appeal failed.     
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The liability of a ship-owner has since changed from the position as provided in the 
above case due to the enactment of section 76(2) of the NPA, which specifically states 
that the pilot is the servant of the owner or master of the vessel during the pilotage 
phase.
32
 In terms of this section, a ship-owner or master is now liable for the actions or 
omissions of the pilot, carried out in performance of his duties under compulsory 
pilotage.
33
 This section has thus introduced the liability of a master in addition to the 
ship-owner.
34
 The first question is whether this section allows a claimant to hold the 
master and the ship-owner liable for the actions of the pilot, jointly and severally, or 
whether the master can be held liable to the exclusion of the ship-owner. The second 
question is whether the section places strict liability upon the ship-owner for all acts of 
the pilot, whether committed in good faith or not.  
 
In order to assess this, section 76(2) must be interpreted to assess whether the provision 
imposes strict liability, which is a form of liability that makes certain parties liable for 




 submits that a starting 
point to interpret a statute is to give the language of the provision its ‘ordinary 
grammatical meaning’. This was reiterated in the case of Natal Joint Municipal 
Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality (“Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund”),
37
 
but the case makes it clear that words cannot be interpreted in isolation. The context to 
the enactment must always be considered when determining what the words used 
mean. Wallis JA held that: 
 
“Interpretation is the process of attributing meaning to the words used in a 
document, be it legislation, some other statutory instrument, or contract, 
having regard to the context provided by reading the particular provision or 
provisions in the light of the document as a whole and the circumstances 
attendant upon its coming into existence. Whatever the nature of 
the document, consideration must be given to the language used in the light of 
the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax; the context in which the provision 
appears; the apparent purpose to which it is directed and the material known to 
those responsible for its production. Where more than one meaning is possible 
each possibility must be weighed in the light of all these factors. The process 
                                                 
32




 Gaskell et al (see Note 12 above), 354 
35
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is objective, not subjective. A sensible meaning is to be preferred to one that 
leads to insensible or unbusinesslike results or undermines the apparent 
purpose of the document. Judges must be alert to, and guard against, the 
temptation to substitute what they regard as reasonable, sensible or 




Upon a proper interpretation of the wording of section 76(2), the ordinary grammatical 
meaning of the words leads to the suggestion that section 76(2) imposes strict liability 
in the form of statutory vicarious liability due to the fact that the section deems the 
pilot to be the servant of the ship-owner or master. However, in following the ratio of 
Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund supra, this section cannot be interpreted in 
isolation, it has to be interpreted within the context of the NPA as a whole, looking at 
determining factors such as the reasoning behind the enactment of the NPA. As already 
mentioned in Chapter 2, the NPA was enacted to cure the defect created by the SATS 
Act, which did not cater for the ship-owners’ liability, leaving an innocent party with 
no recourse to obtaining satisfaction for damages or loss caused whilst the guilty vessel 
was under compulsory pilotage.  
 
Although the ordinary grammatical meaning leads to the conclusion that section 76(2) 
imposes strict liability, the question that arises is to whom does this strict liability lie, is 
it the ship-owner or the master. It is clear that in case of the ship-owner, strict liability 
can be imposed, as the reasoning behind the enactment of the NPA, was to provide for 
the liability of a ship-owner. As set out at the end of Chapter 2, one interpretation of 
the section is that since it makes no reference to the requirement of ‘good faith’, the 
ship-owner would be liable for the actions or omission of the pilot whether the pilot 
was acting in good faith or not. However, a competing interpretation is that if section 
76(2) is read with section 76(1) the ship-owner would only be liable for the actions or 
omissions of the pilot committed in good faith, since in terms of section 76(1) the 
Authority would be liable for the action or omission of the pilot if the pilot was not 
acting in good faith.  
 
The favoured interpretation would be the second interpretation due to the fact that 
section 76(1) specifically states that the Authority will not be liable for the actions of 
the pilot performed in good faith, therefore because this section is silent on whether the 
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Authority will be liable or not when the pilot is not acting in good faith, this section 
should be restrictively interpreted against the Authority, which will be examined 
further in this chapter under the liability of the Authority. In addition the ship-owner 
would want to rely on this to be able to avoid liability or at the very least limit its 
liability. The ship-owner could argue that since the pilot was not acting in good faith, 
and was ultimately the cause of the collision, the ship-owner is not liable on that basis. 
This will be discussed further at the end of the examination of good faith later in this 
chapter.  
 
With regards to the master, section 76(2) does not indicate that the Master's liability is 
to be any different to that of the owner. This ultimately leads to ambiguity as it means 
that the pilot is deemed to be the servant of the ship-owner and the master 
simultaneously. This cannot be a reasonable interpretation of section 76(2), due to the 
fact that the master is himself the servant of the ship-owner. 
 
A reasonable interpretation of section 76(2), taking into account the words used in the 
NPA and the context formed by the master’s employment relationship with the ship-
owner as well as his common law liability, should be that the master is not strictly 
liable, but his liability should be based on whether the master was at fault in some way, 
such as wrongful interference with the affairs of the pilot, or failure to intervene or 
supply information or assistance when he should have done so. Gaskell
39
, who 
discusses the United Kingdom’s PA 1983, submits that this Act has brought about the 
liability of the master, suggesting that:  
 
“…the master can no longer escape liability by abstaining altogether from 
watching the navigation. When and how far he is bound to interfere depends 
on the circumstances of each case. If the pilot was negligent, the owners are 
now always liable. So whatever the master does or omits to do while a pilot is 




South African compulsory pilotage followed along the lines of the United Kingdom’s 
PA 1983
41
 with regards to liability of the ship-owner. The wording of section 35 of the 
United Kingdom’s PA merely says that the master is liable “in the same manner as he 
                                                 
39




 This was discussed in Chapter 2; the United Kingdom’s PA 1983, specifically section 35. 
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would be if pilotage were not compulsory”. Although the wording is thus not the same 
as section 76(2) of the NPA, which went further by deeming the pilot to be the servant 
of the ship-owner or the master, Gaskell’s reasoning can still be used as guidance 
within the South African context as it clarifies the position of liability in general of the 
master. This general position would be important context for a court interpreting 
section 76(2). 
 
Thus in principle it is submitted that on a proper interpretation of section 76(2) the 
master can be held liable for his own actions or omissions. However in practice the 
master’s liability, even if it includes liability for the pilot’s actions, may be moot as in 
most cases the master would not able to afford to pay any of the damages caused 
during compulsory pilotage as the costs could run into hundreds of millions. 
 
Therefore where a collision occurs whilst the vessel is under compulsory pilotage, the 
ship-owner or master will be liable.
42
 This then begs the question as to the 
circumstances in which the Authority will be liable for the actions of the pilot, if any. 
The liability of the Authority will be examined next. 
 
4.3 Liability of the Authority 
In order to ascertain whether the Authority will be liable, it is necessary to analyse 
three concepts, namely, gross negligence, intention and good faith. In addition, the 
cases dealing with these three concepts will also be examined. These will be discussed 
in turn. However before examining these concepts, a brief outline shall be given about 
how an exemption clause that purports to limit liability should be interpreted.  
 
4.3.1 Exemption Clauses 
In order to ascertain when the Authority will be liable, if ever, it is necessary to 
understand how courts have interpreted exemption of liability clauses. This enquiry 
will begin with a consideration of the repealed Railways and Harbours Control and 
Management (Consolidation) Act (“RHCM Act”),
43
 specifically looking at section 43 
of the RHCM Act which provided that “the [Authority] and a pilot who is a servant 
thereof… [shall be exempt] from liability for any loss or damage that may arise or be 
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caused through the act, omission or default of such pilot”.
44
 This provision was 
considered in the case of Shell Tankers Ltd v South African Railways and Harbours 
(“the Aluco”).
45
 The main consideration of the courts concerned concurrent 
wrongdoers and whether the Authority would be liable where the pilot was not the sole 
cause of damage.
46
 The facts before the court were that the Aluco, under the charge of 
Captain Brewin a compulsory pilot, was grounded twice before successfully being 
berthed in the East London Port.
47
 It was alleged that the pilot was not the only cause 
of the grounding as the port pilot, Captain Lindsay, was aware of a shallow sand bank 
in the vicinity of the oil berth and also had knowledge of previous vessels grounding 
on the same sand bank.
48
 He nevertheless gave orders that the Aluco should be brought 




Cloete J, in assessing the liability of the Authority, stated that an exemption clause 
such as the one under consideration in that case “is concerned to limit liability 
normally existing in the common law. It interferes with, and is designed to curtail and 
limit rights, which would otherwise be available under the common law.”
50
 He 
concluded that where an exemption clause purports to limit liability, a restrictive 
interpretation should be given to such clause, and in this instance he held that the 
exemption clause “does not extend to the case where damage is caused by concurrent 
wrongdoers one of whom was the pilot and one another servant of the [Authority].”
51
 
Thus the finding of the court was that the Authority would be liable for damages 
caused to the Aluco by virtue of the fact that the exemption clause did not exempt the 
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This approach above, of restrictively interpreting an exemption clause to exclude 
concurrent wrongdoers, in Hare’s
53
 opinion could be applied to prohibit the Authority 
from exempting liability for loss or damage occasioned during the compulsory pilotage 
phase if the cause of such loss or damage was not caused solely by the pilot, but was 
caused jointly by another employee of the Authority.
54
 However, Hare fails to take into 
account the provisions set out in section 85 of the NPA, which provides that:  
 
“Neither the Authority nor an employee or a representative of the Authority is 
liable for loss or damage caused by anything done or omitted by the Authority, 
the employee or the representative in good faith whilst performing any 




Thus even where the loss is caused through concurrent wrongdoers, the Authority 
would not be liable as the NPA has specifically excluded liability for all its employees, 
whilst performing their duties in good faith, in terms of the Act. However, it could be 
argued that where either one of the concurrent wrongdoers has not performed their 
duties in good faith, then the exemptions provided in either section 76(1) or section 85 
of the NPA will not be applicable as the exemption clause will be interpreted narrowly 
by the courts and the Authority would be liable in that event. 
 
This approach of the court in the Aluco, namely a restrictive interpretation of an 
exemption clause, was approved and followed in the cases of the Yung Chun Fishery as 
well as the MV Stella Tingas. Hare
56
 also agrees with the judgment of the court in the 
Aluco, stating that the findings illustrate two essential features, firstly, that an 
exemption clause should be interpreted restrictively, and secondly, that where the 
Authority attempts to use an exemption clause, it is raising a special defence and thus 
the onus of proof rests upon the Authority to show that the defence is valid. 
Mukheibir
57
 submits that where there is doubt as to whether an exemption clause 
excludes certain conduct, such as negligence or gross negligence, the courts will 
interpret the clause in favour of the person against whom the clause operates.  
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The next step to ascertain whether the authority could be liable is analyse the three 
concepts, gross negligence, intention and good faith, specifically with reference to 
exemption clauses, in order to ascertain the liability of the Authority with regards to 
the NPA, starting with gross negligence.   
 
4.3.2 Gross Negligence 
Didcott J best describes the notion of gross negligence as not being “an exact concept 
lending itself to a neat and universally apt definition.”
58
 However, in the case of S v 
Dhlamini,
59
 gross negligence, otherwise known as culpa lata, was described as 
including an attitude or state of mind characterized by “an entire failure to give 
consideration to the consequences of one’s actions, in other words, an attitude of 
reckless disregard of such consequences”.
60
 Although this case does not fall within the 
scope of compulsory pilotage, it is useful in order to define what gross negligence is. 
 
With that being said, the concept of gross negligence has been before the courts on 
numerous occasions whereby the courts had to ascertain what gross negligence is 
specifically pertaining to compulsory pilotage.
61
 The first of these occasions presented 
itself in the case of the Yung Chun Fishery, where the issue before the court was 
whether the compulsory pilot, Captain Pullen, was grossly negligent in his duties, 
which lead to the Yung Chun No 17 colliding with berth A in the port of Cape Town.
62
 
The vessel was being brought into the harbour in a heavy fog, thus it was essential for 
Captain Pullen to use radar to bring the vessel safely into port.
63
 There was much 
debate about the three radars on board the vessel, however, the fact that the pilot had 
doubts as to whether the radar was in fact working, and nevertheless continued on his 
course was considered to amount to gross negligence.
64
   
 
The defendants alleged that section 10(7) of the first schedule to the SATS Act 
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exempted them from liability for the actions of the pilot and that this exemption 
applied in respect of all “forms of civil negligence including gross negligence or 
recklessness”.
65
 Therefore the courts had to assess whether according to the 
defendant’s contention the exemption provided in section 10(7) of the first schedule to 
the SATS Act included all forms of civil negligence.
66
 Davis J, in ascertaining the 
liability of the Authority relied on the case of the Aluco as authority for interpreting 
exemptions. He stated that according to the Aluco the exemption clause must be 
interpreted restrictively and accordingly that: 
 
“…only the express wording of the section should provide an exemption from 
liability. As the express wording of the exemption provides that only negligent 
acts or omissions on the part of the pilot are exempt from liability it must 
follow from a restrictive approach to such clauses that willful, reckless or 





Davis J further held that in the circumstances Captain Pullen was grossly negligent 
because he had misgivings as to whether or not the hooded radar was functional due to 
the fact that it had no heading marker, was heavily scarred and the checks that were 
performed by himself showed that it was not working properly.
68
 However, Captain 
Pullen made no attempt to utilize another radar, such as the Furuno radar, which 
according to the witnesses was on the bridge and accessible to the pilot at all times, or 
the other hooded radar.
69
 Davis J went onto to state that: 
 
“Not to have insisted that the other radar should be switched on before piloting 
the vessel or examining the bridge a little more carefully in order to ascertain 
the location of the Furuno radar was to hazard a chance. At no time did 
Captain Pullen or any other witness who testified on behalf of defendant 
suggest that the pilot could not have waited 5-6 minutes to power up the other 




In summarizing the above case, Adams and Adams
71
 submit that the Authority was 
held liable on the basis of the “principle of vicarious liability of an employer for acts 
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carried out by his employee during the course and scope of his employment.”
72
 Thus 
now that it has been ascertained that gross negligence cannot be excluded from liability 
and that the pilot’s actions were grossly negligent, the Authority will be liable.  
 
The next case before the court was the MV Stella Tingas, where section 10(7) of the 
first schedule to the SATS Act was deliberated over. Thus to this extent, both the cases 
of the Yung Chun Fishery case and the MV Stella Tingas are similar as they both had to 
examine the extent of section 10(7) of the first schedule to the SATS Act with 
reference to gross negligence. 
 
The facts of the MV Stella Tingas that had been described earlier in this Chapter 
pertained to the liability of the ship-owner, thus this section will deal with the relevant 
facts pertaining to the Authority’s liability. In addition to the facts mentioned above, it 
had been disputed that Captain Buffard, the compulsory pilot in charge of the 
Atlantica, had been speeding.
73
 The court, therefore, had to decide whether this fact, if 
proved, amounted to mere negligence, the occasion of which would exclude liability of 
the pilot and the Authority according to the SATS Act, or if it amounted to gross 
negligence, which according to the case of the Yung Chun Fishery was excluded from 




Scott JA, proposed, rightly so, that: 
 
“...[T]o qualify as gross negligence the conduct in question, although falling 
short of dolus eventualis, must involve a departure from the standard of the 
reasonable person to such an extent that it may properly be categorised as 
extreme; it must demonstrate, where there is found to be conscious risk-taking, 
a complete obtuseness of mind or, where there is no conscious risk-taking, a 
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74
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damages to the MV Stella Tingas. 
75





 approves this definition of gross negligence as correct, although he states 
that in the law of delict, specifically the Aquilian action, the difference between 
ordinary negligence and gross negligence is irrelevant. He further states that it will 
become relevant with regards to certain “statutory provisions that limit liability to 





Returning to the decision of the MV Stella Tingas, Scott JA held that the speed of the 
Atlantica was “excessive to the extent that it contributed to the ‘squat’ and ‘bank 
effect’, which, in turn caused the sheer to port”.
78
 He however, stated that although this 
ultimately contributed to the collision, the pilot’s actions were negligent in the ordinary 
sense and not grossly negligent.
79
 Thus the Authority was not liable for the actions of 
the pilot, which were found to be negligent and not grossly negligent in the 
circumstances.
80
 Thus the appeal from the Authority was upheld.
81
   
 
The final case to be discussed under gross negligence is the case of the Banglar 
Mookh,
82
 which was the last case to be decided under the SATS Act. This case like the 
previous two that have been expounded upon, also concerned the limitation of liability 
with regard to the concept of gross negligence. This case was an appeal from the court 
a quo where the Authority was not liable for the actions of the pilot because his actions 
did not amount to gross negligence.
83
 In looking at the authority of previous cases, 
Yung Chun Fishery and the MV Stella Tingas, Binns-Ward J stated that the “appeal 
court had assumed, without deciding, that the exemption provided in [section] 10(7) of 
the [first] schedule [of the SATS Act] would not apply if the pilot were found to have 
been grossly negligent”
84
 Although he had reservations about whether the previous 
courts had in fact construed the interpretation of the exemption clause properly, Binns-
                                                 
76
















 Owners of the MV Banglar Mookh v Transnet Ltd [2010] ZAWCHC 485 at p5 para 7 
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Ward J did not depart from the previous courts’ approach.
85
 Thus his enquiry was 
whether the pilot’s actions amounted to gross negligence, and having found that they 





The Appeal court focused mainly on whether Binns-Ward J had misdirected his mind 
with regards to the witness testimonies, by concluding that the testimony of the master 
of the Banglar Mookh, Captain Islam should be preferred over that of the compulsory 
pilot, Mr. Grelecki.
87
 Farlam JA and Wallis JA, with Cachalia JA, Tshiqi JA and 
Plasket AJA concurring, held that Binns-ward J had in fact misdirected his mind in 
rejecting the pilot’s version and accepting the master’s version of events.
88
 They 
concluded that the fact that the Authority had not preserved the VTS for evidence, 
should litigation ensue, was not unfair.
89
 Thus the Authority was not liable for the 
actions of the pilot, as the pilot’s actions were found not to be grossly negligent.  
 
Thus it clear that exemption clauses, such as the section 10(7) of the first schedule to 
the SATS Act, must be interpreted restrictively to exclude acts of gross negligence. 
The next question then is whether this also applies to intentional acts of the pilot. 
 
4.3.3 Intention 
Intention or dolus can be construed as the will that is directed at a particular result, and 
Neethling
90
 suggests that this must be done with consciousness of the wrongfulness of 
the conduct in question. There are essentially three types of intention, namely, dolus 
directus, dolus indirectus and dolus eventualis.
91
 This chapter is mainly concerned with 
the application of dolus eventualis and the way in which it has been interpreted within 
exemption clauses, but for clarity, the former types of dolus will be briefly discussed.  
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Dolus directus is present where a person willfully desires the consequence of his 
conduct, whereas dolus indirectus is present where a person desires the outcomes of 
one consequence and “at the same time has knowledge that another consequence will 
unavoidably or inevitably also occur.”
92
 The final form of intention is dolus eventualis, 
which according to Joubert
93
 is a more common type of intention.  
 
Dolus eventualis does not relate to the will of the desired outcome and/or the 
unavoidable consequence that comes with it.
94
 According to Neethling,
95
 dolus 
eventualis is present where the “wrongdoer not desiring a particular result, foresees the 
possibility that he may cause the result and reconciles himself to this fact; that is, he 
nevertheless performs the act which brings about the consequence in question.”
96
 In 
addition to these requirements set out by Neethling, Joubert
97
 suggests that dolus 
eventualis includes an element of recklessness. Snyman
98
 proposes that the accused 
must have been “reckless in respect of the prohibited result”.
99
 He further accepts that 
this means consciously accepting a risk. 
 
The concept of recklessness, however, is not an easy concept to reconcile because, on 
the one side of the spectrum, it can be regarded in the narrow sense as dolus eventualis 
but on the other side, it can be considered in the wide sense as gross negligence.
100
 
Thus the dividing lines between the two can be blurred. In support of this view, 
Snyman
101
 points out that some authors are of the opinion that recklessness should not 
form part of dolus eventualis, as the foreseeability of the consequence ensuing is 
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sufficient. This is evident from the fact that some writers such as Smith,
102
 who has 
tried to analyse whether recklessness is either gross negligence or dolus eventualis, 
suggest that on the one hand, recklessness exists where a person’s conduct was 
unreasonable, which can sometimes be classified as ‘advertent negligence’ or gross 
negligence. Smith,
103
 considered the case of S v Du Preez,
104
 where Ogilvie Thompson 
CJ held, in a murder trial, that “to shoot with a pistol in the direction of a moving 
human being, leaving so small a margin for safety may indeed fairly be described as 







 view seems to be in keeping with Smith’s submissions on this point, as 
he puts forward the idea that dolus eventualis must not be confused with recklessness, 
because recklessness:  
 
“may also refer to a serious degree of negligence, [t]hus confusion between 
dolus eventualis and [gross] negligence may occur. The distinction between 
these two concepts can be explained as follows: in the case of [gross] 
negligence the question is whether the consequence objectively seen, was 
reasonably foreseeable, while in the case of dolus eventualis the question is 





On the other hand, Smith
108
 suggests that there are other views that recklessness is in 
fact dolus eventualis; in support of this, he looks at the case of S v De Bruyn,
109
 where 
Holmes JA held “that one of the characteristics of dolus eventualis was an insensitive 
recklessness (which has nothing in common with culpa)”.
110
 The test for recklessness 
was proposed in the case of Philotex (Pty) Ltd and Others v Snyman And Others; 
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 Smith (see Note 102 above) 90 
109





Braitex (Pty) Ltd and Others v Snyman and Others (“Philotex”),
111
 where Howie JA 
stated that: 
 
“The test for recklessness is objective insofar as the defendant's actions are 
measured against the standard of conduct of the notional reasonable person 
and it is subjective insofar as one has to postulate that notional being as 
belonging to the same group or class as the defendant, moving in the same 




It had also been noted by Howie JA that the “expression ‘reckless disregard of the 
consequences’ in Dhlamini must not be understood as pertaining to foreseen 





The preferred view of what recklessness entails, within the context of compulsory 
pilotage, is from the case of the MV Stella Tingas, where Scott JA accepted the 
definition and the test that had been proposed in the case of Philotex, and accordingly 
stated that recklessness is present:  
 
“If a person foresees the risk of harm but acts, or fails to act, in the 
unreasonable belief that he or she will be able to avoid the danger or that for 
some other reason it will not eventuate, the conduct in question may amount to 
ordinary negligence or it may amount to gross negligence (or recklessness in 
the wide sense) depending on the circumstances… [or if] the risk of harm is 
foreseen and the person in question acts recklessly or indifferently as to 
whether it ensues or not, the conduct will amount to recklessness in the narrow 
sense, in other words, dolus eventualis; [thus] it would then exceed the bounds 




Thus it is clear that in certain situations, recklessness could be either, in the wide sense 
gross negligence or, in the narrow sense dolus eventualis. Where an exemption clause 
attempts to exclude liability for dolus, whether dolus directus, dolus indirectus or dolus 
eventualis, it would be against public policy and therefore void.
115
 On the other hand it 
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is not against public policy to exclude liability for gross negligence if the exemption 
clause is sufficiently clearly worded to achieve this result.
116
 However, in considering 
cases such the MV Stella Tingas, it can be seen that in practice it is difficult to 
distinguish between recklessness in the narrow sense and recklessness in the wide 
sense. 
 
Thus where a pilot who is compulsorily in charge of a vessel acts recklessly in the 
narrow sense, in that he actually foresaw the possibility of harm ensuing and acted or 
failed to act, being indifferent as to whether the harm ensued or not, his actions would 
amount to dolus eventualis. In such circumstances it would be against public policy to 
allow the Authority to exclude liability for acts done intentionally by the pilot, which 
could cause damage to property or loss of life of any of the persons on board the 
vessel.  
 
The last concept to be examined is the concept of good faith which is the most 
important concept pertaining to the compulsory pilotage according to the NPA.  
 
4.3.4  Good Faith 
Good faith becomes particularly relevant where a collision occurs and there are 
disputes between the parties as to what good faith entails. At this point in time there are 
no cases that have been decided under section 76(1) of the NPA. Section 76(1) of the 
NPA provides that “neither the Authority nor the pilot is liable for loss or damage 
caused by anything done or omitted by the pilot in good faith whilst performing his or 
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her functions in terms of this Act.”
117
 Looking at this section, it is clear that the 
Authority will not be liable where the pilot’s actions or omissions were done in good 
faith.
118
 In addition to section 76(1) of the NPA, the concept of good faith is followed 
in other sections of the NPA, not specifically dealing with compulsory pilotage; these 
include section 85 dealing with the liability of the Authority in general.
119
 However, 
the NPA does not elaborate upon what good faith entails, and as Hare
120
 correctly 
points out, that the legislature has not defined the concept of good faith. Thus in the 
future, if an event were to occur, the concept of good faith will be the deciding factor 
as to whether the Authority will be liable for the actions or omissions of the pilot. 
Therefore it is left open for debate as to what constitutes good faith and whether the 
Authority will be liable for acts, which are not intentional but are caused through gross 
negligence of the pilot. 
 
It is clear that good faith is a relatively new concept, specifically in relation to 
maritime law in South Africa. Hare
121
 agrees with this statement and submits that there 
are two other recent shipping Acts that contain “exemptions from liability for loss or 
damage for good faith acts or omissions”,
122
 he further states that these Acts have not 
defined what good faith entails. Thus what good faith entails is more difficult to 
ascertain than either gross negligence or intention. Therefore this section of the chapter 
will attempt to unpack this concept of good faith by looking at the ordinary dictionary 
meaning of good faith as well as examining how this concept has been interpreted in 
other aspects of law in South Africa such marine insurance law, in order to ascertain its 
meaning and application as a form of guidance, to establish what good faith means 
within the context of compulsory pilotage. It will then discuss how this concept could 
be interpreted with respect to the section 76(1) of the NPA.  
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The definition of good faith according to the English Oxford Dictionary is “honesty or 
sincerity of intention.”
123
 The Legal Information Institute goes further by stating that 
good faith in certain circumstances could “require [inter alia], an honest belief or 
purpose, faithful performance of duties, observance of fair dealing standards, or an 




 states that in the context of compulsory 
pilotage, the ordinary meaning of the words ‘good faith’ is that “the pilot, in carrying 
out his or her functions as [a] pilot, must have acted in the honest belief that the course 




This can be contrasted to the definition of negligence and gross negligence offered by 
Scott JA in the case of the MV Stella Tingas, where the act was performed or the 
omission occurred because even if the harm was foreseen the pilot had an unreasonable 
belief that the harm would not ensue. This immediately raises the question of whether a 
person can be said to be acting in good faith if their belief was honest, but was 
unreasonable, or even grossly unreasonable. Before this question is answered, the way 
in which good faith must be interpreted will be analysed.  
 
When a statutory provision such as section 76(1) of the NPA, which specifically 
provides for a curtailment of an individuals rights, it has been submitted by Burchell
127
 
that it must be narrowly interpreted in order to give it a restrictive meaning. However, 
because the concept of good faith is relatively new within maritime law, this 
interpretation will be ascertained with regards to how the concept of good faith has 
been interpreted within other areas of law. In the context of exemption clauses, 
Brown
128
 postulates that on the basis of a public policy argument, exemption clauses 
cannot apply to conduct done fraudulently or in bad faith. It has, however, been argued 
that good faith should not be formulated on the basis that where a person’s actions 
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were in bad faith, it would therefore mean that good faith would not exist in that 
situation.
129
 Thus the approach should be formulated on a different basis, hence the 
need to look to other areas of law to approach the interpretation of the concept of good 
faith. 
 
Within the context of marine insurance, good faith is an important and prominent 





suggests that good faith goes beyond the duty of the insured to disclose information, 
but courts have been reluctant to accept the concept of good faith as a free standing 
pre-requisite.
132
 This point was emphasized by Hare,
133
 in an address to the British 
Maritime Law Association (“BMLA”) at Trinity House in London, titled ‘Of Black 
Books, White Horses, and Scared Cows: The Quest for International Uniformity in 
Maritime Law’ where he made the statement that “our law has been reluctant to 
embrace good faith fully”.
134
 This is also evident from the decision in the case of 
Barkhuizen v Napier,
135
 which concerned a constitutional challenge of a time limitation 
clause in a short term insurance contract; the court stated the following:  
 
“Good faith is not a self-standing rule, but an underlying value that is given 
expression through existing rules of law.
 
In this instance, good faith is given 
effect to by the existing common law rule that contractual clauses that are 
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The court, however, did not venture too far into interpreting the concept of good faith, 
but remarked that:  
 
“[T]here is a compelling argument for the proposition… [that] the requirement 
of good faith should be applicable to the enforcement of time limitation 
clauses, [however] the applicability of these common law principles will 






 further states that the only time that the courts are willing to accept the concept 
of good faith applicable to contracts as a free standing concept is in instances of fraud, 
where the innocent party to the contract will be able to avoid liability due to a breach 
of good faith. The case of the Star Sea
139
 is a good example of this in practice. The 
court, as per Leggatt LJ, pointed out that a contract of marine insurance is based upon 
the utmost good faith, which is a continuing duty.
140
 The court went further by stating 
that where one party brings a claim, the duty of the utmost good faith entails that such 
claims must not be made fraudulently, and where such claim is fraudulent, the innocent 






 puts forward the proposition that the concept of utmost good faith was an 
invention of the English legal system and that according to the case of Mutual & 
Federal Insurance Company Limited v Outdshoorn Municipality (“Outdshoorn 
Municipality”),
143
 the court, as per Joubert JA, dismissed the need for South African 
courts to use the principle of utmost good faith, due to the fact that the Roman Dutch 
principle of good faith will suffice according to South African law.
144
 In addition, 
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Good faith becomes particularly relevant in the prevention of loss or damage, which 
according to English marine insurance provides “that it is the duty of the assured to 





 suggests that this principle can be used in the South African context, 
which would involve the concept of good faith necessitating an insured person to take 
steps to avert the happening of a risk. He further proposes that: 
 
“If a reasonable assured, acting in good faith, could have taken steps to avert 
the happening of the risk altogether, or, once it happened, to reduce the effect 
thereof, the insurer should be able to argue that the assured has acted in breach 




This test above however, is similar to the test for ordinary negligence as set out in the 
case of Kruger v Coetzee,
149
 which is based objectively on the reasonable person test. 
If this test above were to be followed as a form of guidance in order to ascertain what 
good faith is for the purposes of compulsory pilotage, it would follow that the test is 
not sufficient enough to prove that the pilot did not act in good faith because as noted 
above good faith entails an aspect of honest belief in the performance of one’s duties. 
Thus if the test above were to be followed, it would need to be supplemented with 
additional criteria. In assessing what this criterion is and how it would apply to 





 who assesses good faith within the context of delict, suggests that “good 
faith is something essentially within the knowledge of the actor”,
151
 that being so, the 
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additional criteria can be based on subjective factors. In support of this, Bouwman,
152
 
who analyses good faith in the context of a directors duty and skill, states that although 
the Companies Act
153
 has not specifically included clause 91(1)(b) of the 2007 
Companies Bill,
154
 it is a good reference as to how good faith should operate within the 
circumstances of a directors fiduciary duties. She submits that clause 91(1)(b) would 
have codified the director’s common law fiduciary duties and that:  
 
 “…in terms of this clause a director is subject to a fiduciary duty 'to act 
honestly and in good faith, and in a manner that the director reasonably 
believes to be in the best interests of and for the benefit of the company’.”
155
 
(Author’s emphasis added) 
 
It is clear from the above section that good faith means that the director’s fiduciary 
duties requires that there is a reasonable belief that their actions would be in the best 
interest of the company. Within the context of WTO dispute resolutions, Mitchell,
156
 
states that:  
 
“‘Good faith’ is often used interchangeably with ‘bona fides’, which is defined 
as ‘freedom from intent to deceive’. The touchstone of good faith is therefore 
honesty, a subjective state of mind, but the principle can also incorporate 
notions of fairness and reasonableness, both of which concern an objective 
state of affairs. Unfortunately, terms like honesty, fairness and reasonableness 






 accepts this idea, and suggests that in order to determine whether the pilot 
acted in good faith, a subjective and an objective approach should be taken. He states 
that the “subjective enquiry entails ascertaining the pilot’s state of mind not only with 
reference to his or her own evidence but also with reference to the circumstances 
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giving rise to the damage or loss.”
159
 He further submits that the objective inquiry is to 
ascertain whether the pilot had acted with “reasonable grounds for holding [his or her] 
belief as to the appropriateness of the course of action [that he or she] followed”.
160
 
However, according to Hare’s interpretation, the Authority will almost never be liable 
for the actions of the pilot, due to the fact that this would mean that even if the pilot 
acted negligently or even grossly negligently, the Authority would not be liable as long 




Thus it is best to have an inquiry that is based on both an objective and a subjective 
approach. Thus a similar view should be taken with regard to the compulsory pilotage. 
However, in order to avoid such a consequence that follows from Hare’s proposition 
above, where the subjective approach is used, it would be best to give more weight to 
the evidence of the circumstances surrounding the pilot’s actions rather than the pilot’s 
own version of events, because if reliance is placed more on the pilot’s version, he 





At this point, the question of whether a person can be said to be acting in good faith if 
their belief was honest, but was unreasonable, or even grossly unreasonable must be 
addressed. To answer this question, it is important to have regard to the concept of 
recklessness in the wide sense, of gross negligence, and in the narrow sense, of dolus 
eventualis, which have been discussed at length earlier in this chapter.
163
 With regards 
to recklessness, in the case of the Philotex,
164
 the court as per Howie JA, described 
recklessness as “the doing of something which in fact involves a risk, whether the doer 
realises it or not; and the risk being such, having regard to all the circumstances, that 












 Burchell (see Note 127 above) 12 
163
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164





In addition Howie JA rejected the decision from the case of Ex parte De Villiers and 
Another NNO: In re Carbon Developments (Pty) Ltd (in Liquidation) (“Ex Parte De 
Villiers”)
166
 which was relied on in the court a quo, and stated that “consequently, the 
genuine belief referred to [in the case of Ex Parte De Villiers]… [will] not avail if 
objective considerations nonetheless established recklessness.”
167
 It had also been 
noted by Howie J that the “expression ‘reckless disregard of the consequences’ 




Therefore in answering the question above, the approach to interpreting good faith is to 
construe it narrowly. Thus where the actions or omissions of the pilot are either 
reckless in the wide sense of grossly negligent, or reckless in the narrow sense of dolus 
eventualis, which would be excluded as it is against public policy to exempt liability 
from intentional acts. Thus the Authority should not be able to rely on the exemption 
of liability clause due to the facts that the belief of the pilot, although subjectively 
honest, will not avail if the objective factors show that the pilot’s actions were reckless. 
Consequently he cannot be said to be acting in good faith where his actions caused the 
happening of the risk and he did not in any way avert or reduce the happening of the 
risk. In addition, if the consequences of the pilot’s actions were foreseen then this 
amounts to dolus eventualis, or where the consequences were culpably unforeseen, 
amounting to recklessness in the wide sense of gross negligence, then the pilot will not 
be acting in good faith. Burchell
169
 proposed that: 
 
“An inference of bad faith can in certain circumstances be drawn from the 
existence of grossly unreasonable conduct. The actor's motive, for instance, 
may be so obviously improper or based on such irrelevant considerations, or 
the actor may have acted from such spite or vindictiveness, that an inference of 
bad faith can be drawn… If the servant of the state knew or foresaw the 
possibility that his conduct was unlawful he could not justifiably claim to have 
acted in good faith even if he genuinely believed that his action was necessary 
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Therefore it is clear that from the analysis of good faith within other areas of law that 
the test should be whether the belief of the pilot was honestly held by comparing his 
evidence to the circumstances, objectively seen, and whether in those circumstances a 
pilot could reasonably have formed that belief. Therefore the test looks for objective 
indications of the existence of a rational honest belief held by the pilot and where the 
pilot’s actions are irrational in the circumstances, in the sense that the consequences 
are reasonably foreseeable and are culpably unforeseen, he will not be acting in good 
faith.  
 
It could also be argued, depending on the circumstances of the case, that the ship-
owner and the Authority could be liable jointly. However in this case the question then 
arises whether they are to be held liable proportionately for the damages caused by the 
pilot’s actions.
171
 The reasoning for this is twofold; firstly, if the pilot’s actions were 
not in good faith, the Authority cannot rely on the exemption in section 76(1), and 
secondly, section 76(2) provides that the pilot is the servant of the owner or master, 
thereby making the ship-owner or master vicariously liable for the actions of the pilot. 
In support of this Hare
172
 submits that: 
 
“The effect of the subsections of section 76 read together would… appear to 
be that where the Authority cannot bring itself within the ambit of the 
exemption from liability in section 76(1), both it and the [ship-]owner or 
master of the vessel under [compulsory] pilotage, as deemed employer in 
terms of section 76(2), may be vicariously liable as joint wrongdoers under the 
Apportionment of Damages Act.
173
 The failure to specify in section 76(2) that 
the owner or master of the vessel under [compulsory] pilotage is liable for the 
pilot’s acts or omissions in good faith only appears to produce this result, 
rather than to allocate vicarious liability for the pilot’s bad or good faith acts or 
omissions as between the Authority and the [ship-]owner or master of the 




According to Hare’s submission above, two positions exist. The first is that where the 
pilot is acting in good faith, the Authority will be exempt of liability whilst the ship-
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owner will be liable. The second position that exists is that where the pilot’s actions are 
found to be in bad faith, the Authority, who cannot rely on the exemption clause in 
section 76(1), and the ship-owner will be liable jointly. However, Hare does not 
examine how the liability of the ship-owner or master and the Authority would be 
apportioned in such circumstances. Thus if a court were to find the Authority and the 
ship-owner or master liable for an equal amount, i.e. on a 50:50 basis, this would create 
an unfair situation as the Authority will never be liable for more than half of the 
damages that had been caused by a pilot, who in reality is the Authority’s employee, 
that is forced upon the ship-owner or master to use. This interpretation of this 
exemption clause goes against the way in which the courts interpret exemption clauses, 
namely restrictively. This was discussed at length earlier in this chapter. 
 
Where the pilot is not acting in good faith, the ship-owner could argue that since the 
pilot was not acting in good faith, and was ultimately the cause of the collision, the 
ship-owner is not liable on that basis. This argument is based on the fact that the NPA 
does not make provision for the situation where the Authority and the ship-owner are 
jointly liable.  
 
It is submitted that where the pilot’s actions are intentional, there is an even stronger 
argument that the Authority should be liable for the damages to the exclusion of the 
ship-owner. Support for this interpretation can be drawn by reference to Boberg
175
 who 
states that, “there can be no apportionment where the defendant acted intentionally and 
the plaintiff was merely negligent in common cause.” Although this statement does not 
deal specifically with compulsory pilotage, the principle of apportionment postulated 
by Boberg can be applied to compulsory pilotage where the ship-owner is the plaintiff, 
whose negligence contributed to the damages, and the Authority is the defendant, 
whose pilot has acted in bad faith. For example the ship-owner may be suing for 
damage to his own ship, caused in a collision whilst under compulsory pilotage. In this 
scenario, it can be argued that the ship-owner should not be contributorily liable for the 
actions of the pilot done in bad faith and the ship-owner should accordingly not be 
barred from claiming damages against the Authority. As already postulated earlier in 
this chapter, good faith should not include either intentional actions or gross 
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negligence, therefore the proposition above that applies to intentional actions should 
also apply to instances where the pilot’s actions are found to grossly negligent.  
 
Thus where the pilot does not act in good faith, the ship-owner would want to rely on 
this to be able to avoid liability or at the very least limit its liability. This can be done 
by interpreting section 76 so as to include an implied limitation to the effect that the 
ship-owner will only be liable where the pilot is acting in good faith. The reasoning for 
this is to resolve an undesirable situation created by the NPA providing the pilot with 
two employers, namely the Authority as the actual employer and the ship-owner as the 
deemed employer. To interpret section 76(1) and (2) in this way would mean that the 
ship-owner, who is the plaintiff, and is suing the pilot’s actual employer, is 
nevertheless himself liable as the deemed employer of the pilot for the pilot’s 
intentional conduct.  
 
The next section will be a look at a case study of the recent grounding of the MV 
Smart. Although this incident does not relate to compulsory pilotage, it is nevertheless 
important to explore because it deals with the harbour master’s actions of allowing the 
vessel to leave the harbour. The liability of the Authority will depend on whether the 
harbour master performed his or her duties in good faith, according to section 85 of the 
NPA, a similar provision to that on compulsory pilotage. 
 
4.3.4.1 Case study of the MV Smart 
On the 19
th
 of August 2013, the MV Smart,
176
 a 230m long bulk carrier fully laden with 
+/-148 000 tons of coal, upon leaving the Richards Bay harbour, ran aground and 
broke up.
177
 This was due to swells of waves reportedly up to 10m in height, causing 
the vessel’s stern to hit the bottom of the seabed resulting in the steering and engines of 
the vessel seizing.
178
 This caused the master and crew to lose control of the vessel, 
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 states that the vessel was drawing 17.4m of water in a 22m channel, thus 
resulting in a very small margin of error in rough conditions.
181
 The port Authority 
claimed that the vessel was not under compulsory pilotage at the time, as the pilot had 
already disembarked from the vessel.
182
 Immediately after the incident, port authorities 




The question that has been posed with regards to the grounding of the MV Smart is 
whether the vessel should have been allowed to leave the harbour.
184
 Comments have 
been made that it was a bad judgment call for the harbour master to allow the vessel to 




 suggested that the reason why the 
vessel was allowed to leave could possibly have been due to the consideration of the 
costs involved if the vessel had not left. However, this reasoning is not sufficient 
enough to allow a vessel of that size or depth, while being fully laden, to leave the 
harbour, whilst the conditions for leaving were not conducive due to swells of that 
magnitude.  
 
In terms of section 85 of the NPA, the Authority will not be liable for the actions of the 
harbour master, allowing the vessel to leave the confines of the harbour in such 
weather conditions, or for the harbour master’s omissions, in not preventing the vessel 
from leaving the harbour, if done in good faith during the performance of his or her 
duties.
187
 Thus the question that arises yet again is what good faith means and entails.  
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 The NPA (see Annexure A), section 85  
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The inquiry should, as mentioned above, be based on both an objective and subjective 
enquiry into whether or not the harbour master acted in good faith. In applying the test 
that was formulated above, which is, mutatis mutandis, whether the belief of the 
harbour master was honestly held by comparing his evidence to the circumstances, 
objectively seen, and whether in those circumstances a harbour master could 
reasonably have formed that belief. In considering whether the harbour master acted in 
good faith by allowing the MV Smart to leave or by its omissions in not stopping the 
MV Smart from leaving, the following circumstances objectively seen, must be taken 
into account in order to ascertain whether the harbour master could have reasonably 
have formed that belief and also whether that belief in the circumstances is a rational 
belief.  
 
These circumstances are inter alia, that firstly, there were waves of excessively high 
magnitude, and secondly, that the vessel was fully laden vessel drawing approximately 
17.4m of water in a 22m channel. Accordingly, these circumstances are not be 
conducive to allow a vessel of its size to leave the harbour, and that where the harbour 
master had formed the belief that in letting the vessel leave the harbour, the vessel will 
be able to leave the harbour confines safely without incident would be irrational due to 
the adverse weather conditions. If it is found that the harbour master had breached his 
obligation to act in good faith, where the belief of the actions taken are irrational in the 
sense that the occurrence of an incident such as this one, would not occur, as it is 
reasonably foreseeable that damage could ensure due to the magnitude of the waves in 
a small channel resulting in the vessel hitting the bottom of the seabed, which could 
have been averted by not allowing the vessel to leave the confines of the harbour until 
the storm had passed. 
 
In addition, if it were found that by allowing the vessel to leave, the harbour master’s 
conduct was reckless in the wide sense of gross negligence, where his belief could be 
considered in the circumstances to be “an entire failure to give consideration to the 
consequences of one’s actions, in other words, an attitude of reckless disregard of such 
consequences”,
188
 then in the light of the surrounding circumstances the consequences 
will be culpably unforeseen by the harbour master. Consequently, the harbour masters 
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actions would fall short of acting in good faith and thus the Authority would not be 
able to rely on the exemption from liability. 
 
It follows from the reasoning above that it would not be reasonable for a harbour 
master to have formulated his belief that the consequences would not eventuate and 
thus his actions will be reckless. Therefore the harbour master’s actions or omission 
will not be performed in good faith and in that event, the Authority would be liable for 
the loss and damage caused to the vessel. Another inquiry that could be made is to 
determine whether the ship-owner or the master were independently at fault, this can 
occur where the ship-owner or master, despite the weather conditions, were reconciled 
to leave the harbour due to financial considerations such as demurrage. However, an 
analysis of the possible apportionment of liability that would need to be undertaken in 
such a case, is a completely separate issue to the difficult questions that arise around 
apportioning liability between a ship-owner and the Authority for the actions of a 
compulsory pilot.  
 
4.4 Recommendations. 
The reason for the inclusion in the NPA of the requirement of good faith could 
possibly be because if an incident occurred whilst under compulsory pilotage, the 
vessel more often than not will be insured for loss or damage; the same goes for the 
cargo on board the vessel.
189
 It would be unfair for the Authority to be liable at every 
instance where an incident involving the vessel under compulsory pilotage occurred, 
especially as the loss or damage is covered by the ship-owner’s insurance. However, 
this does not mean that the Authority should never be liable at all for loss or damage to 
a vessel or its cargo.  
 
Thus a recommendation could be that it should be mandatory for the Authority to 
create an insurance policy that caters specifically for situations of collisions that are 
caused by the pilots during their services where their actions are done in good faith. 
This policy can be limited to instances where the incident caused damage to the 
harbour infrastructure only, thus the costs of loss or damage is shared by both the ship-
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owner, for damages towards their vessel, and the Authority, for damage towards the 
infrastructure.  
 
The ship-owner in most cases is insured against losses as stated above, therefore the 
next recommendation is that were the ship-owner is found liable, his liability should be 
limited, in order to solve the perceived unfairness of making the ship-owner liable for 
all incidents caused by the pilot. In addition, the Authority will also be protected to the 
extent of the ship-owners liability.  
 
The next recommendation is that where the pilot’s actions are not in good faith and the 
ship-owner or master is also at fault, the Authority and the ship-owner could be 
proportionately liable for the damages. However, where the ship-owner is not liable 
and the pilot is the sole cause of the loss, as he was not acting in good faith due to his 
actions being either grossly negligent or intentional, the Authority should be liable 
fully in those circumstances.  
 
The final recommendation is to put in place certain forms of punishment, such as fines, 
for the pilots who have been negligent whether or not their actions were done in good 
faith or not as this would curb pilot-related incidents of navigation, thereby reducing 
the costs of damages or loss for potential incidents.  
 
4.5 Conclusion  
Thus it can be seen from the investigations above that the ship-owner will be liable for 
the actions of a pilot performed in execution of his duties in good faith. The position 
regarding the Authority’s liability is provided for in section 76(1), which states that the 
Authority will not be liable for the actions or omissions of the pilot performed in good 
faith. However, the concept of good faith is a vague concept and the legislature has not 
helped to give clarity on the concept as the meaning of good faith has been left silent in 
the NPA. Thus it is necessary to find out how courts have examined exclusionary 
clauses. According to the MV Stella Tingas, an exemption clause must be construed 
narrowly.  
 
With regards to compulsory pilotage, the exemption contained in section 76(1) should 
also be interpreted narrowly, and the test to ascertain whether the pilot acted in good 
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faith or not should be based on the test formulated above. In addition, where the 
actions of the pilot are not intentional, but amount to gross negligence, it should be 
excluded from good faith as gross negligence entails “an entire failure to give 
consideration to the consequences of one's actions, in other words, an attitude of 
reckless disregard of such consequences”. Therefore, if gross negligence were 
excluded from the ambit of good faith, the Authority would be liable for pilot’s actions 


































Compulsory pilotage is a system where a ship-owner by compulsion of law has to use 
the services of pilot to navigate vessels into and out of the harbour. This system is used 
by states in order to reduce the likelihood of collisions or allisions. However, there are 
circumstances where collisions do occur in the port. When such events occurred in the 
past, the Authority, in accordance with the SATS Act, was not liable for negligent 
actions or omissions of the pilot. The Act did not regulate the position regarding the 
liability of the ship-owner. This was the issue in the case of the MV Stella Tingas, the 
result of which was that neither the Authority nor the ship-owner were found liable for 
the actions of the pilot. This created a lacuna in the law and, as a result, innocent ship-
owners were not able to get satisfaction for damages sustained to their vessel by a 
guilty vessel which was under compulsory pilotage at the time. The solution was the 
enactment of the NPA, which provided that the ship-owner would be liable for actions 
of the pilot, and the Authority would not be liable for the actions of the pilot performed 
in good faith. The dissertation asked the question whether the inclusion of the concept 
of good faith actually solved the problem or created a new one. Thus the main 
objective of this dissertation was to analyse the liability according to the NPA. 
 
5.2 Summary of the Findings 
A comparison of the compulsory pilotage system in the United Kingdom and the South 
Africa was made in Chapter 2. It was found that, according to the common law of the 
United Kingdom, a ship-owner would not be liable for the actions of the pilot because 
the pilot was not the employee of the ship-owner on the basis that it would not be fair 
for a ship-owner to be held liable for the actions of a pilot that they were forced to take 
on board to render pilotage services. The position changed to one where the ship-
owner was not liable to one where the ship-owner was liable for the actions of the pilot 
when the Pilotage Act of 1913 abolished the defence of compulsory pilotage. The 
position in South Africa is now regulated by the NPA, with section 76(1) providing 
that the Authority will not be liable for the pilot’s actions or omissions made in good 
faith, and section 76(2) expressly stating that the pilot is deemed to be the employee of 
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the ship-owner during pilotage and that the ship-owner will be liable for the actions of 
the pilot. 
 
The dissertation also explored the situations where a divided command over the vessel 
was the cause of many collisions. This issue has been solved by the NPA, which 
provides that the master is in command whilst the pilot is merely an advisor during the 
compulsory pilotage phase. In addition, the circumstances in which the master may 
intervene in the affairs of the pilot, namely, where there is an emergency, are also 
provided in the NPA, which was discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
Chapter 4, which is the main chapter, examined the liability of both the ship-owner and 
the Authority, with the focus being on the liability of the Authority. It is clear that the 
Authority will be liable where the pilot did not act in good faith in performing his 
duties. The concept of good faith is a relatively new concept within an exemption 
clause, in the context of maritime law and according to numerous authors is a vague 
concept. Hence the need for it to be interpreted so as to avoid disputes as to what 
circumstances will be excluded from good faith. The way forward in interpreting the 
concept of good faith is to interpret it narrowly to exclude actions of gross negligence, 
as well as to use an objective and subjective approach discussed above.  
 
5.3 Conclusion and Recommendations 
It has been demonstrated in this dissertation that compulsory pilotage is an important 
aid that reduces the incidents of collisions by making it mandatory for all vessels 
entering and leaving the harbour to use the services of a pilot. However, there are 
issues with what good faith entails such as whether it is merely a simplistic meaning of 
honesty and whether good faith excludes certain concepts such as gross negligence. It 
is clear from the analysis in this dissertation, particularly chapter 4, that the concept of 
good faith must be taken to be an honest belief in the performance of duties.  
 
The recommendation made in Chapter 4 as a means of balancing the competing 
interests of both the ship-owner and the Authority were: 
1. The Authority is liable, where the pilot acted in good faith, for damage to 
infrastructure in the ports and must take out insurance to cover such damages, and 
the ship-owner will be liable for the damages to their vessel. 
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2. A limitation of the liability of the ship-owner under section 76(2). The Authority 
will also be protected, as the ship-owner will be liable, albeit for a limited amount, 
for damages caused to other vessels. 
3. Apportionment of damages between the Authority and the ship-owner where the 
pilot was not acting in good faith and the ship-owner or master was also at fault. 
4. Where the pilot’s actions were not in good faith, the Authority will be liable.  
5. Penalties be applied against pilots so as to cub pilot-related incidents. 
 
Finally the test formulated in this dissertation to prove whether the pilot acted in good 
faith or not, should be based on both an objective approach and a subjective approach. 
However, more weight must be given to the circumstances surrounding the pilot’s 
actions than on the evidence of the state of the pilot’s mind. If the latter were given 
more weight, this would in all cases lead to good faith being distorted, as a pilot cannot 
be said to be acting in good faith where his actions are grossly negligent. The 
exemption would apply to widely if it only excluded conduct amounting to dolus 
eventualis. Therefore the test is whether the belief of the pilot was honestly held by 
comparing his evidence to the circumstances, objectively seen, and whether in those 
circumstances a pilot could reasonably have formed that belief. In this way, where the 
pilot’s actions are grossly negligent, his belief in those circumstances will not be 

















Extracts of the National Ports Act 12 of 2005 
 
Section 75:  Pilotage 
(1) Subject to subsection (2), a pilot must navigate every vessel entering, leaving or 
moving in a port. 
(2) Pilotage is not compulsory in respect of any vessel or class of vessels that have 
been exempted from pilotage by the Authority in writing. 
(3) The pilot's function is to navigate a vessel in the port, to direct its movements and 
to determine and control the movements of the tugs assisting the vessel under pilotage. 
(4) The pilot must determine the number of tugs required for pilotage with the 
concurrence of the master of the vessel. 
(5) In the event of a disagreement between the pilot and the master of the vessel 
regarding the number of tugs to be used as contemplated in subsection (4), the Harbour 
Master takes the final decision. 
(6) The master of the vessel must at all times remain in command of the vessel and 
neither the master nor any person under the master's command may, while the vessel is 
under pilotage, in any way interfere with the navigation or movement of the vessel or 
prevent the pilot from carrying out his or her duties, except in an emergency, where the 
master may intervene to preserve the safety of the vessel, cargo or crew and take 
whatever action he or she considers reasonably necessary to avert the danger. 
(7) Where the master of the vessel intervenes as contemplated in subsection (6), he or 
she must immediately inform the pilot of the vessel and, after having restored the 
situation, must permit the pilot to proceed with the execution of his or her duties. 
(8) The master of the vessel must ensure that the officers and crew are at their posts, 
that a proper lookout is kept and that the pilot is given all assistance necessary in the 
execution of his or her duties. 
 
Section 76:  Liability of pilot 
(1) Neither the Authority nor the pilot is liable for loss or damage caused by anything 
done or omitted by the pilot in good faith whilst performing his or her functions in 
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terms of this Act. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the pilot is deemed to be the 
servant of the owner or master of the vessel under pilotage and such owner or master is 
liable for the acts or omissions of the pilot. 
 
Section 85:  Liability of Authority 
Neither the Authority nor an employee or a representative of the Authority is liable for 
loss or damage caused by anything done or omitted by the Authority, the employee or 
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